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[I]t is at least problematical whether an unjust sentence against a 
foreigner . . . would not, if unredressed, be an aggression upon his 
sovereign, as well as one which violated the stipulations in a treaty 
or the general law of nations.1 
— Alexander Hamilton 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States has long lectured about the rule of law to 
other countries—traditionally to Latin America, but lately also to 
Asia, Africa, and eastern Europe.2 Americans emphasize that the rule 
of law is necessary to those who participate in the global economy. 
The U.S. government and private organizations have done more 
than lecture; they have devoted considerable resources to helping 
other countries establish effective legal systems.3 Public and private 
 
 1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 476–77 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
 2. See, e.g., Remarks on the New Markets Legislation Agreement, 36 WKLY. COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 1192 (May 23, 2000) (President Clinton urging the importance of advancing the 
rule of law in China); Development Beyond Economies, THE GLEANER, May 11, 2000, available 
in 2000 WL 12119344 (describing Economic and Social Progress Report of the Inter-
American Development Bank, arguing that Latin America must improve its adherence to the 
rule of law and strengthen weak judiciary); Thaksina Khaikaew, U.S. Urges Asia to Tackle Cro-
nyism for Economic Stability, Associated Press, July 28, 2000 (Secretary of State Madeleine Al-
bright urging Southeast Asian countries to strengthen the rule of law and curb official corrup-
tion and cronyism); Al Laranjeiro, U. Florida Conference Addresses State’s Benefits from Latin 
American Trade, U-WIRE, May 30, 2000, available in 2000 WL 21058142 (U.S. Special En-
voy to the Americas Buddy McKay Jr. calling for “transparency and rule of law” in Latin Amer-
ica, stressing the relationship between the rule of law, democracy, and economic development, 
expressing concern that foreign investors are not able to turn to the courts for help). 
 3. See, e.g., Testimony of Ann Van Dusen, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for 
Policy and Program Coordination, U.S. Agency for International Development: Before the Sub-
comm. on Int’l Operations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. (1999) 
available in 1999 WL 20010787 (describing U.S. Agency for International Development’s 
funding of rule of law initiatives in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe); FY 98 
Foreign Operations Appropriations: Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations of the House 
Comm. on Appropriations, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Lucinda A. Low on behalf of the 
American Bar Association) available in 1997 WL 10570218 (describing extensive ABA Global 
Rule of Law Projects in the context of the Foreign Operations Appropriations budget; projects 
cover Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America); Paula Dobriansky, 
America’s Most Rewarding Export, WASH. TIMES, June 10, 1992, at G4 (associate director for 
policy and programs, United States Information Agency, describing extensive USIA efforts to 
assist other countries in establishing the rule of law); US-China Legal Cooperation Fund An-
nounces China Rule of Law Awards, PR NEWSWIRE, May 23, 2000 (describing private busi-
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groups regularly send lawyers and judges out to developing countries 
as missionaries preaching the importance of an independent judici-
ary, fair and settled substantive rules, and even-handed application of 
the law.4 But it behooves us to set our own house in order, not to 
ignore problems with our justice system that themselves undermine 
international trade and our position as advocates of the rule of law in 
the world. We ourselves are less than perfect in this regard and may 
in fact be in violation of international agreements because of it. 
While many American jury verdicts are reasonable, in cases in-
volving foreign or out-of-state defendants, they can be very large and 
bear little relation to the actual injury suffered.5 This is a recognized 
problem for American business and is increasingly a problem for for-
eign businesses too, as a result of greater global trade and invest-
ment.6 The U.S. Supreme Court has thus far shown few signs of act-
ing to resolve the problem.7 The U.S. Congress has tried multiple 
 
ness-backed fund to encourage “stronger US-China cooperation in the field of law”). 
 4. See, e.g., FY 98 Foreign Operations Appropriations: Before the Subcomm. on Foreign 
Operations of the House Comm. on Appropriations, supra note 3 (describing ABA’s extensive 
funding of visits by American judges and lawyers to other countries to provide advice); Dobri-
ansky, supra note 3, at G4 (describing USIA’s sending several delegations of American judges 
to Moscow to conduct workshops for Russian judges, sending legal experts to Kazakhstan, and 
a federal judge to Albania); Kenyan System Stifles Rights, U.S. Jurists Say, S.F. CHRON., July 
20, 1991, at A10 (describing reactions of a delegation of U.S. jurists to Kenya). 
 5. Empirical studies of civil damages have concluded that, in effect, there are essentially 
two damages systems: a large realm of moderate awards and a smaller one of extraordinarily 
high awards. This is especially the case with punitive damages. See, e.g., STEPHEN DANIELS & 
JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM 231 (1995); Marc Galanter, 
Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1135–36 (1996); Michael 
Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes With Em-
pirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 62 (1992) (referring to “a very few abnormally large jury 
awards”). 
 6. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and Economic Analysis, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1999, at 73, 74–75; Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L. 
Blaner, Civil Justice Reform in America: A Question of Parity with Our International Rivals, 
13 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 1, 1–4 (1992); Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 
30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95, 163 & n.270 (1996). 
 7. In its latest foray into the question of the constitutionality of punitive damages 
awards, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), the Supreme Court held a 
punitive damages award unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause because it was exces-
sive but provided little guidance to courts on how to judge future cases. See, e.g., Jane Mallor 
& Barry S. Roberts, Punitive Damages: On the Path to a Principled Approach?, 50 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1001, 1010–14 (1999) (noting ambiguities in the BMW opinion); Leading Cases, Puni-
tive Damages—Grossly Excessive Awards, 110 HARV. L. REV. 145, 145–46 (1996) (noting am-
biguities in the BMW opinion). Based on empirical research, scholars have found that the 
BMW v. Gore opinion has had no significant effect on damage awards. Theodore Eisenberg & 
Martin T. Wells, The Predictability of Punitive Damages Awards in Published Opinions: The Im-
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times to pass tort reform bills, but it has failed.8 Scholarly attention 
has focused on these two methods of solving the problem of exces-
sive verdicts. However, where the Supreme Court and Congress have 
failed, a new group of international agreements might succeed. This 
article will focus on an agreement that may prove especially potent in 
reining in verdicts: the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(“NAFTA”). Since other trade agreements are likely to be patterned 
on NAFTA, including the proposed Free Trade Agreement of the 
Americas (“FTAA”),9 it is important to understand NAFTA’s poten-
tial impact on the U.S. justice system. Our desire for international 
trade is starting to collide with our unusual (by international stan-
dards) system of civil justice, and that collision may generate tension 
that saps support for international trade agreements. 
One of the key features of NAFTA is its provisions for individual 
investors to sue foreign nations directly to enforce the agreement’s 
guarantees.10 These are known as investor-state provisions and are a 
change from the traditional international law system, in which only a 
state could bring an action against another state. Through investor-
state provisions, “public” international law has become more private. 
The United States has long championed investor-state provisions as a 
way to prevent countries from expropriating U.S. citizens’ invest-
ments, particularly in Latin America. In general, capital-exporting 
countries favor investor-state provisions to protect their citizens from 
lesser-developed countries’ temptation to confiscate foreign assets. 
In addition to this procedural mechanism, NAFTA encompasses 
a substantive doctrine that capital-exporting countries have invoked 
against less-developed countries: the prohibition of denial of jus-
tice.11 Under this international law doctrine, a state is responsible for 
injustices committed by its courts as well as by its executive or legis-
lature. Denial-of-justice claims were frequently brought when the 
underlying cause was physical harm to or incarceration of individuals; 
 
pact of BMW v. Gore on Punitive Damages Awards, and Forecasting Which Punitive Awards 
Will Be Reduced, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 59, 59 (1999). 
 8. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Should Congress Engage in Tort Reform?, 1 MICH. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 121, 136–39 (1996) (discussing various tort reform proposals). 
 9. The FTAA appears to be moving steadily toward completion in the next few years. 
See Rossella Brevetti, Proposal to Accelerate FTAA Talks To Be Discussed at Ministers’ Meeting, 
17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1866, 1866 (Dec. 7, 2000). 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part IV. 
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most of these situations are now covered by international human 
rights law. In civil cases, the main concern has traditionally been fear 
that the court system of a developing country will not provide ade-
quate redress for economic harm, such as seizure of assets. Develop-
ing countries, particularly in Latin America, and capital-exporting 
countries such as the United States have disagreed strongly over the 
scope of the denial of justice doctrine. NAFTA firmly embraces the 
view of the capital-exporting countries. 
While there was a flurry of scholarship on denial-of-justice claims 
in the 1930s, with some interest through the early 1960s, there has 
been little recently.12 Academic interest in denial of justice questions 
has tended to wax and wane according to the frequency of expro-
priations of foreign investments. There ought to be greater interest 
in this doctrine now that international agreements such as NAFTA 
have the potential to create liability based on events other than out-
right seizure of assets and through claims brought by individual in-
vestors. This article will help address this gap by examining the ex-
tent to which certain American verdicts—awarded by state courts, in 
particular—may be judged denials of justice under international law. 
It is especially ironic that the U.S. government faces potential li-
ability for American verdicts thanks to a combination of the proce-
dural mechanism of investor-state claims and the substantive doc-
trine of denial of justice, both championed by the United States to 
protect against the misdeeds of other countries. U.S. liability could 
be considerable; in certain respects, American verdicts are far out of 
step with those of other countries. State courts, especially, are apt to 
provide few checks on juries and judges determined to transfer large 
amounts of money from aliens to in-state plaintiffs through compen-
satory and punitive awards.13 
There is currently an arbitration under NAFTA, Loewen v. 
United States,14 brought by a Canadian individual and corporation 
against the United States based on a $500 million verdict in Missis-
sippi state court. This case provides a good example of how the in-
vestor-state provisions and the denial of justice doctrine may work 
together to create U.S. liability for state court judgments. Suits such 
 
 12. See infra notes 89–104. 
 13. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 14. The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States of America, case no. ARB(AF)/98/3 
(registered Nov. 19, 1998). 
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as these have potential to trouble free trade agreement negotiations 
and functioning because they may be seen as interfering with U.S. 
sovereignty, including federal-state relations and such tenacious insti-
tutions as civil jury trials and punitive damages. 
Because of these sovereignty concerns, NAFTA as it currently ex-
ists is probably not the best way to address problems with state court 
judgments that harm aliens. Several possible strategies present them-
selves.15 One approach, at the international level, is to return to the 
old method of requiring the investor’s country to bring these claims 
on the investor’s behalf. But this approach might allow many in-
stances of discrimination against aliens to go uncompensated; often, 
nations may decide not to pursue claims for political reasons.  
A better approach, at the national level, would help to prevent 
violations from occurring in the first place. The Founders, particu-
larly Alexander Hamilton, were aware of the international problems 
an unjust decision against a foreigner could cause. Hamilton’s solu-
tion, embodied in Article III of the U.S. Constitution, was to allow 
foreigners to remove their cases to federal court. The Founders’ con-
cerns about aliens are now more relevant than ever because of the 
global economy. Unfortunately, the rule requiring complete diversity 
prevents many foreigners from removing their cases to federal court 
and subjects them to the full force of local biases in state courts. By 
abandoning the complete diversity requirement as to aliens, the 
United States could restore Hamilton’s solution and spare interna-
tional and national strife. 
The article begins in Part I by describing the Loewen case as an 
example of the challenges a foreign litigant may face in state court 
and how suits can be brought against the U.S. government to com-
pensate the foreign investor under NAFTA. Part II outlines the in-
vestor-state provisions of NAFTA. It shows how these provisions 
originated in fears about expropriation of foreign assets, particularly 
in Latin America, but lately have been used to challenge government 
actions going beyond traditional expropriation, such as regulatory 
takings. Using the investor-state provisions to compensate for denials 
of justice in state courts is another means of expanding the scope of 
these provisions. Part III demonstrates that claims for denial of jus-
tice are well established in international law, and they may include 
both claims of procedural unfairness (lack of an impartial tribunal, 
 
 15. See infra Part VI. 
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etc.) and claims of substantive injustice (a faulty decision on the mer-
its or an excessive award of damages). Traditionally, denial-of-justice 
claims were brought by one state against another on behalf of its in-
jured national. Part III also discusses the specific ways in which the 
U.S. civil justice system may be said to violate international standards 
and produce denials of justice. The most significant factor here, the 
article argues, is the use of elected judges and the relationships be-
tween these judges and plaintiffs’ lawyers, focusing on the role of ju-
dicial campaign contributions. 
Claims against the United States for denial of justice could po-
tentially interfere with the right of U.S. states to organize their jus-
tice systems as they see fit and also could trouble the relations be-
tween the federal and state governments. Part IV outlines these 
concerns. Both the general principle of holding governments liable 
for decisions of the judicial branch and the specific mechanism of ar-
bitration used under NAFTA pose problems. Ultimately, decisions 
against the United States under the investor-state provisions, particu-
larly decisions based on denial of justice, may undermine support for 
international trade agreements. Part V addresses possible responses 
to these difficulties. It discusses both the international and national 
approaches mentioned above and concludes that the national solu-
tion of expanding diversity jurisdiction for aliens would best reduce 
domestic and international strife. 
II. OVERVIEW OF A NAFTA CLAIM UNDER THE INVESTOR-STATE 
PROVISIONS 
A. The Civil Litigation in State Court 
The Loewen case is the sort of verdict that gives observers of the 
U.S. legal system pause. The plaintiff in the U.S. court proceedings, 
Jeremiah O’Keefe, owns a Mississippi funeral home and insurance 
company and sued The Loewen Group, Inc. for breach of contract 
in Mississippi state court.16 The Loewen Group is based in Vancou-
ver and is North America’s second-largest funeral home and service 
company.17 O’Keefe named as defendants not only The Loewen 
 
 16. For a dramatic and detailed account of the proceedings in Mississippi state court, 
including profiles of the plaintiff, defendant, and their lawyers, see Jonathan Harr, The Burial, 
NEW YORKER, Nov. 1, 1999, at 70. 
 17. See NAFTA: Canadian Funeral Company Uses NAFTA to Seek Damages for U.S. 
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Group, Inc. and its subsidiary Loewen Group International, Inc. (in-
corporated in Delaware) but also local Mississippi corporations 
owned by Loewen Group International. By naming these Mississippi 
defendants, O’Keefe prevented Loewen from removing the case to 
federal court.18 “The dispute centered on three contracts valued by 
O’Keefe at $980,000 and one alleged contract involving a proposed 
exchange of two O’Keefe funeral homes, worth about $2.5 million, 
for a Loewen insurance firm worth about $4 million.”19 The total 
amount involved in the underlying transactions was considerably less 
than $10 million. The lead plaintiff’s lawyer was Willie E. Gary, a 
flamboyant figure who is a member of the “Million Dollar Verdict 
Club” and the “Golden Legal Eagles,” both clubs whose members 
refuse cases alleging less than $100 million in damages.20 
At the 1995 trial, O’Keefe testified that “if the settlement was 
not carried out, he would have to fight for his life . . . against a rich 
and powerful international corporation.”21 The plaintiff’s case fea-
tured the O’Keefe family’s 130 year history of operating funeral 
homes and insurance companies in Mississippi as opposed to 
Loewen’s “foreign” base.22 There was considerable testimony to the 
effect that O’Keefe, who is white, was not a racist.23 Four prominent 
Hinds County figures and Mike Espy, former Agriculture Secretary 
and friend of Mr. O’Keefe, testified to that effect. On cross examina-
tion, Espy testified about the alleged unfair trade practices of Cana-
 
Court Ruling, 15 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1978 (Nov. 25, 1998). The company has about 
13,000 employees and operates 1,100 funeral homes and more than 500 cemeteries in the 
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. According to the company, 90% of 
Loewen’s revenue comes from the U.S. market. See Robert E. Lutz & Russell C. Trice, 
NAFTA at Five and the Loewen Case: Is NAFTA the Blood Relative of Lady Justice or the Angel 
of Death for State Sovereignty?, TRANSLEX, Oct. 1999, at 1 n.1. 
 18. See infra Part VI.B.2. 
 19. NAFTA: Panel Expected To Be Constituted Soon in Canadian Firm’s $725 Million 
NAFTA Claim, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 81 (Jan. 20, 1999) [hereinafter Panel Expected]. 
 20. See Yvonne Samuel, Florida Attorney to Receive State King Award, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Jan. 8, 1998, at B1. Gary’s private jet is named “Wings of Justice.” Id. Recently, 
he has become involved in a lawsuit alleging racial discrimination against Coca-Cola, in which 
he plans to ask for $1.5 billion in damages. Betsy McKay, Attorneys in Coke Race-Bias Settle-
ment Assail Lawyer Who Filed Separate Suit, WALL ST. J., Jun. 30, 2000, at B8. 
 21. Lutz & Trice, supra note 17, at 1. 
 22. See, e.g., Transcript, Jeremiah J. O’Keefe, et al. v. The Loewen Group, Inc., et al., 
No. 91-67-423 (Cir. Ct., 1st Judicial Dist. Hinds County), at 1998, 2000, 2010 (copy on file 
with author). 
 23. See Panel Expected, supra note 19, at 81. The presiding judge and eight of the 
twelve jurors were black. Id. 
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dian wheat farmers: “The Canadian wheat was underpriced. They 
would come in, flood our markets, our people would eat a lot of 
pasta, and they would not buy American wheat.”24 Besides issues of 
race and national origin, plaintiff’s counsel emphasized Loewen’s 
personal wealth. Cross-examination of Ray Loewen (during the li-
ability, not punitive damages, phase) began with an extended discus-
sion, covering three pages of trial transcript, of whether Loewen’s 
boat was a yacht.25 Plaintiff’s counsel’s closing argument referred to 
O’Keefe’s service in the U.S. armed forces during World War II: 
O’Keefe “fought, and some died for the laws of this nation, and 
they’re [Loewen] going to put him down for being American.”26 
Counsel repeated Espy’s testimony regarding Canadian wheat farm-
ers27 and concluded by drawing an analogy between Loewen’s com-
petition with O’Keefe and the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor.28 
The jury awarded $100 million in compensatory damages, of 
which $75 million was for emotional distress, and $400 million in 
punitive damages for a total of $500 million.29 Shortly after the ver-
dict was handed down, the foreman of the jury (who, interestingly, 
was born in Canada but had moved to Mississippi thirty years be-
fore30) said that Ray Loewen “was a rich, dumb Canadian politician 
who thought he could come down and pull the wool over the eyes 
of a good ole Mississippi boy. It didn’t work.”31 In order to appeal, 
Mississippi requires posting an appeal bond of 125 percent of the 
judgment amount.32 This bond, however, may be reduced or waived 
for good cause.33 According to Loewen, the verdict represented be-
tween 63 percent and 78 percent of the company’s net worth.34 
 
 24. Transcript, supra note 22, at 1101–02. 
 25. See id. at 5106–08. The following question is representative of the exchange: “Well, 
can you land a helicopter on your canoe, boat or yacht, which one? Can’t you land a helicopter 
on it?” Id. at 5106. 
 26. Id. at 5588. 
 27. See id. at 5587–88. 
 28. See id. at 5593–94. 
 29. See Final Judgment, Jeremiah J. O’Keefe, et al. v. The Loewen Group, Inc., et al., 
No. 91-67-423 (Cir. Ct., 1st Judicial Dist. Hinds County) (copy on file with author). 
 30. Harr, supra note 16, at 91. 
 31. Nina Bernstein, Brash Funeral Chain Meets Its Match in Old South, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
27, 1996, at A6. 
 32. See MISS. R. APP. P. 8(a) (1999). 
 33. See id. at 8(b). 
 34. See Loewen’s Notice of Claim, Jeremiah J. O’Keefe et al. v. The Loewen Group, 
Inc. et al., No. 91-67-423 (Cir. Ct., 1st Judicial Dist. Hinds County), at 42 (copy on file with 
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Loewen claims its costs of posting a full appeal would have exceeded 
$200 million, which it would not have been able to recover even if it 
had won the appeal.35 The Mississippi Supreme Court refused to re-
duce the appeal bond, and, therefore, O’Keefe would have been able 
to levy on Loewen’s assets within a week.36 Loewen settled with 
O’Keefe for $175 million.37 
B. Claims Under NAFTA Chapter 11 
Loewen, already highly leveraged, was not willing to give up. In 
November 1998, Loewen filed for arbitration against the United 
States alleging violations of the investor-state provisions of 
NAFTA.38 These provisions, found in NAFTA Chapter 11, provide a 
direct remedy for individual investors from one NAFTA Party against 
another NAFTA Party in cases where government actions have inter-
fered with NAFTA guarantees.39 Chapter 11 subchapter A sets out 
the substantive guarantees; subchapter B sets out the remedial pro-
cedure. 
Claims under the investor-state provisions of NAFTA are arbi-
trated. Under Chapter 11 subchapter B, the individual investors have 
the choice of proceeding under one of the following methods of ar-
bitration: (1) before the International Centre for Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes (“ICSID”); (2) before an ad hoc arbitral body es-
 
author). 
 35. See id. at 43–44. 
 36. Loewen had considerable assets in Mississippi and elsewhere in the United States 
that could be levied on. Harr, supra note 16, at 80, 94. 
 37. Gary reportedly received $69 million in contingency fees from the settlement. Sam-
uel, supra note 20, at B1. The second chair plaintiff’s lawyer in the Loewen case, according to 
his testimony in a suit his ex-wife brought for increased child support, received the following 
fees from the Loewen settlement: a $2 million cash payment in 1996; 60,000 shares of re-
stricted Loewen stock valued at $24 per share in 1997; and 4% ownership in a noninterest-
bearing note of $80 million from which he would receive twenty annual payments of $160,000 
starting in February 1997. Cavanaugh v. Cavanaugh, No. 97-CA-00553 COA, 1998 Miss. 
App. LEXIS 656, at *4 (Miss. App. Aug. 18, 1998). In June 1999, the Loewen Group filed 
for bankruptcy protection to reorganize its debt. (The company had other woes; it fended off a 
takeover bid and faced additional litigation, including a securities class action.) The company’s 
Chairman told shareholders in June that the reorganization could render Loewen’s shares al-
most completely worthless. Lutz & Trice, supra note 17, at 2 n.3. 
 38. See The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States of America, case no. ARB(AF)/98/3 
(registered Nov. 19, 1998). 
 39. “NAFTA Party” is the technical term for countries that have joined NAFTA: the 
United States, Mexico, and Canada. 
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tablished pursuant to the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) rules; or (3) before ICSID’s Ad-
ditional Facility.40 The Additional Facility was established to arbitrate 
disputes involving non-ICSID members or their nationals. Loewen 
brought its claim before the ICSID’s Additional Facility because, al-
though the United States is an ICSID member, Canada is not.41 
Under NAFTA rules, arbitration panels normally consist of three ar-
bitrators: “one . . . appointed by each of the . . . parties and the 
third, who [acts as] the presiding arbitrator, appointed by agreement 
of the disputing parties.”42 The tribunal for the Loewen case was im-
paneled on March 17, 1999, and is made up of one arbitrator each 
from the United States, Canada, and Australia.43 The tribunal held 
its first session in Washington, D.C., on May 18, 1999. The U.S. 
government responded to the claim in late February 2000, filing an 
objection to the panel’s jurisdiction. According to an associate gen-
eral counsel of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative speaking 
in April 2000, the panel decided to hear jurisdictional issues first, 
and so the U.S. government has not yet filed a memorial on the mer-
its.44 Arbitration hearings and filings are generally not available to the 
public.45 
The actions of the Mississippi courts were alleged to have vio-
lated three provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11.46 The first is Article 
1102, which requires NAFTA governments to treat investors from 
other NAFTA Parties no less favorably than it treats its own inves-
 
 40. See North America Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1993, art. 1120, 107 Stat. 2057 
[hereinafter NAFTA]. For an excellent overview of NAFTA arbitration procedures, see gener-
ally 1 Ralph H. Folsom et al., NAFTA Dispute Panels: Structure and Procedures, HANDBOOK 
OF NAFTA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT ch. 2 (1998). 
 41. “Canada is not a party to the case but the Canadian government will get copies of 
documents filed in the matter.” Panel Expected, supra note 19, at 81. 
 42. NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1123. 
 43. See List of Pending Cases (visited Oct. 25, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org 
/icsid/cases/pending.htm>. The arbitrators are: Anthony Mason, president, of Australia; L. 
Yves Fortier of Canada, and Abner J. Mikva, former chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit, of the United States. See id. 
 44. See Rossella Brevetti, NAFTA: U.S. Challenges NAFTA Panel’s Jurisdiction in Ca-
nadian Funeral Firm’s Chapter 11 Case, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 637 (Apr. 20, 2000) 
(reporting remarks of Steven F. Fabry, associate general counsel of the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, to the American Bar Association’s Section of International Law and Practice). 
 45. “Filings may be available through the Freedom of Information Act, counsel for 
Loewen [has noted].” Panel Expected, supra note 19, at 81. Public Citizen has filed a FOIA 
request for information about the arbitration. See id. 
 46. Loewen’s Notice of Claim, supra note 34, at 48–60. 
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tors. Article 1102 further specifically provides that a state or province 
must provide treatment no less favorable than the most favorable 
treatment they give to investors of the country of which it forms a 
part. The second provision is Article 1105, which sets out a mini-
mum standard of treatment for NAFTA Parties’ investors. This Arti-
cle provides that investments by another NAFTA Party’s investors 
must be treated “in accordance with international law, including fair 
and equitable treatment and full protection and security.” Loewen 
alleges the trial court violated this provision “by allowing O’Keefe’s 
lawyers to repeatedly elicit irrelevant and highly prejudicial testi-
mony, and to make irrelevant and highly prejudicial comments, 
about the nationality, race, and class of the principal parties in the 
litigation.”47 Other violations of Article 1105 were the “grossly ex-
cessive verdict” and the Mississippi Supreme Court’s application of 
the bonding requirement.48 Third, the Mississippi courts were al-
leged to have violated Article 1110, which prohibits nationalization 
or expropriation (or actions “tantamount to nationalization or ex-
propriation”) of investments of NAFTA Parties’ investors. (There is 
an exception to this provision, but only for takings done for a public 
purpose, on a nondiscriminatory basis, in accordance with due proc-
ess of law and the principles of international law, and where payment 
of fair market compensation is made.49) Loewen claims this provision 
was violated in the trial judge’s permission of discriminatory conduct 
at trial, the excessive verdict, the denial of a right to appeal, and the 
“coerced” settlement.50 
Loewen also stresses NAFTA Article 105, which places an obli-
gation on NAFTA Parties with respect to states and provinces. Arti-
cle 105 provides that “the Parties shall ensure that all necessary 
measures are taken in order to give effect to the provisions of this 
Agreement, including their observance . . . by state and provincial 
governments.” Because of this provision, Loewen argues, the United 
 
 47. Id. at 57. 
 48. Id. at 54, 58. 
 49. Article 1110 of NAFTA is modeled on the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 (1987), Economic Injury to Nationals of 
Other States: “A state is responsible under international law for injury resulting from: (1) a 
taking by the state of the property of a national of another state that (a) is not for a public pur-
pose, or (b) is discriminatory, or (c) is not accompanied by provision for just compensa-
tion. . . .” 
 50. Loewen’s Notice of Claim, supra note 34, at 59. 
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States government is responsible for Mississippi’s violations of 
NAFTA.51 Loewen cites a letter written by Michael Kantor, who was 
then U.S. Trade Representative, at the time NAFTA was signed by 
the United States. Kantor stated: “Article 105 . . . mean[s] that the 
federal government will be held accountable if it cannot secure state 
or provincial compliance with NAFTA obligations.”52 
To support its claims, Loewen has assembled a formidable legal 
team. The former president of the International Court of Justice, Sir 
Robert Jennings, declares in an appendix to Loewen’s Notice of 
Claim that the jury’s verdict constitutes a clear violation of interna-
tional law since it was “so bizarrely disproportionate as almost to 
defy belief.”53 “Of a $500 million judgment in a case involving prop-
erty and assets in dispute of only a few million dollars, one might al-
most say res ipsa loquitur.”54 This verdict was the result, he says, of 
the plaintiff’s counsel’s “ruthless and blatant working up of both ra-
cial and nationalistic prejudice,” unrestrained.55 Loewen also secured 
an affidavit from Richard Neely, the colorful former Chief Justice of 
the West Virginia Supreme Court and a member of the Association 
of Trial Lawyers of America (“ATLA”). Neely is known for his blunt 
opinions on the treatment of out-of-state corporations by state 
courts.56 In the Loewen case, Neely says, it is virtually certain that 
Loewen was “intentionally subjected to a complete denial of justice 
by the Mississippi trial court and the Mississippi Supreme Court” be-
cause of its Canadian citizenship.57 Neely says that “even for a plain-
tiff’s lawyer like me, the case . . . from beginning to end, descends to 
the level of a mockery of justice.”58 The claim also includes an Octo-
ber 29, 1998, letter by Mississippi Governor Kirk Fordice to the 
NAFTA Dispute Resolution Tribunal, maintaining that the Loewen 
verdict “stands as a vivid example of the continuing need for . . . re-
 
 51. Id. at 61–63. 
 52. Letter from Michael Kantor to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Subcomm. on Health 
and the Env’t. (Sept. 7, 1993), H.R. REP. NO. 103-361(III), at 132 (1993), reprinted in 
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2858, 2862. 
 53. Opinion of Sir Robert Jennings in The Loewen Group Case, Appendix A of 
Loewen’s Notice of Claim, supra note 34, at 13. 
 54. Id. at 4. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See infra text accompanying notes 119–26. 
 57. Opinion of Richard Neely in The Loewen Group Case, Appendix B of Loewen’s 
Notice of Claim, supra note 34, at 17. 
 58. Id. at 3. 
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form.”59 He said that the trial appeared to have been “tainted by 
xenophobic rhetoric” and called the amount of the verdict “shock-
ing.”60 He wrote, “[i]t concerns me that Loewen’s status as a Cana-
dian company may have deprived it of fundamental rights that would 
otherwise be guaranteed to the citizens of our state.”61 
To compensate it for these various violations, Loewen is claiming 
a total of $725 million in damages.62 Of this total, $175 million are 
to compensate for the amount Loewen claims it was coerced into 
paying to settle the case, and $550 million are for reduction in the 
value of Raymond Loewen’s shares in the firm that resulted from the 
verdict and for harm to his reputation.63 
The Loewen filing under NAFTA has not gone unnoticed by 
various advocacy groups. Public Citizen and Friends of the Earth 
have pointed to the Loewen arbitration as evidence of NAFTA’s in-
fringement on U.S. sovereignty. Public Citizen held a press confer-
ence on the Loewen case and has devoted substantial parts of its web-
site to information about it.64 At the press conference, Public Citizen 
president Joan Claybrook called the Loewen arbitration “an all-out 
attack on democracy. If successful, it would undermine the jury sys-
tem, which is fundamental to our system of justice.”65 Both Public 
Citizen and Friends of the Earth are calling for the renegotiation of 
Chapter 11 to prevent such arbitrations in the future.66 
 
 59. Letter from Governor Kirk Fordice to the NAFTA Dispute Resolution Tribunal, 
Oct. 29, 1998, in Appendix C of Loewen’s Notice of Claim, supra note 34, at 1–2. 
 60. Id. at 1. 
 61. Id. at 2. 
 62. See Loewen’s Notice of Claim, supra note 34, at 67. 
 63. See id. at 66–67; Panel Expected, supra note 19, at 81. 
 64. Public Citizen also has a joint website with Friends of the Earth entitled “NAFTA’s 
Corporate Lawsuits,” which discusses the Loewen case. See NAFTA’s Corporate Lawsuits (vis-
ited Jan. 26, 2000) <http://www.citizen.org/pctrade/nafta/cases/fancy.pdf>. 
 65. NAFTA: Public Citizen Calls NAFTA Suit Attack on Democracy, Jury System, 15 
INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 2007 (Dec. 2, 1998). 
 66. See NAFTA’s Corporate Lawsuits, supra note 64. 
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III. CHANGING USES FOR INVESTOR-STATE PROVISIONS: FROM 
REMEDYING TRADITIONAL EXPROPRIATION TO ATTACKING 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
A. Origins of Investor-State Provisions: U.S. Fears of Latin American 
Expropriation 
The ability of a private party to sue a foreign government directly 
is relatively recent in international law. Traditionally, states were the 
only actors who had a legal personality in international fora. If a 
state’s national were injured by the acts of a foreign government, 
only the state itself could bring a claim, acting on its national’s be-
half.67 The idea was to protect state sovereignty from attacks by pri-
vate parties and to manage international disputes through orderly 
channels sensitive to larger issues between states.68 
This concept of the state alone having a legal personality in in-
ternational fora began to crumble with the advent of international 
arbitration conventions in the 1950s and 60s. Especially important 
was the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Be-
tween States and Nationals of Other States, which established the 
ICSID in 1966.69 That convention provided a venue, rules of arbitra-
tion, an administrative counsel, a secretariat, and expertise to allow 
arbitrations between investors and foreign states to go forward. Be-
fore that time, World Bank staff members and particularly the presi-
dent of the World Bank had served as mediators or conciliators of in-
 
 67. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
677–78 (3d ed. 1993) (describing customary international law whereby a state only may assert 
a claim against another state on behalf of its national); James H. Carter, Investor-Host State 
Investment Dispute Settlement Procedures, in THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT: ITS SCOPE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTH AMERICA’S LAWYERS, BUSINESSES 
AND POLICYMAKERS § D.I (Claire Reade ed., 1993). 
 68. This concept of protecting state sovereignty from the incursions of private party 
suits lies behind the act of state doctrine, according to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court has 
said that, under the act of state doctrine, “‘the courts of one country will not sit in judgment 
on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances 
by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign 
powers as between themselves.’” Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 
(1963) (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)). This doctrine deals with 
national, rather than international fora, but the same motivation to protect sovereignty is evi-
dent. 
 69. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals 
of Other States, Mar.18, 1965, art.1, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 1273. 
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vestor-state disputes on an ad hoc basis.70 The ICSID was intended 
to relieve the World Bank staff and president of this burden and to 
promote greater flows of foreign investment.71 
The United States has been particularly enthusiastic about inves-
tor-state provisions and use of the ICSID. The U.S. government has 
signed dozens of Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”), which pro-
vide for investor-state disputes to be arbitrated under either ICSID 
or UNCITRAL rules.72 The standard investor-state provision for ar-
bitration in these U.S. BITs was the model for the investor-state 
provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11 subchapter B.73 The United States 
has pushed for these provisions largely because of concerns with for-
eign expropriation of U.S. investor assets abroad.74 This problem has 
plagued U.S. investments for some time, particularly in Latin Amer-
ica. The expropriations by the Cuban government following the 
revolution there were keenly felt by some Americans,75 and “Mex-
ico’s nationalization of the oil industry in 1938 is still part of the col-
lective U.S. corporate memory.”76 The main motivation behind 
NAFTA Chapter 11 was to protect U.S. and Canadian investments 
from seizure by the Mexican government.77 It is therefore especially 
ironic that such a provision is now being used to attack a decision of 
an American court as a denial of justice. 
B. Creative Uses of Chapter 11: Regulatory Takings 
NAFTA Chapter 11, like many BITs, has very broad protective 
language that would seem to encompass much conduct beyond tra-
ditional expropriation. It is now being used to get compensation for 
 
 70. See ICSID’s website at <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/main.htm>. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty, 
92 AM. J. INT’L L. 621, 632 (1998). 
 73. See Matthew Nolan & Darin Lippoldt, Obscure NAFTA Clause Empowers Parties: 
Investor-Protection Clause Lets Companies Haul Signatories into Arbitration for Violation of 
Pact, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 6, 1998, at B8. 
 74. See Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive 
Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 27 INT’L LAW. 727 (1993). 
 75. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that 
U.S. owners of sugar expropriated by the Cuban government were denied a remedy because of 
the act of state doctrine). 
 76. Nolan & Lippoldt, supra note 73, at B8. 
 77. Id. 
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a wide range of other harms.78 This expansion is stirring up opposi-
tion that may ultimately lead to an overhaul of NAFTA or even put 
the entire agreement in jeopardy.79 The Loewen case is but one ex-
ample of the creative use of Chapter 11. The Loewen case so far is 
unusual in attacking a judicial decision of a NAFTA Party; more 
common are complaints about regulatory takings. To date, U.S. 
companies have filed for arbitration involving regulatory takings un-
der Chapter 11 in about half a dozen known cases.80 Most of these 
cases are still pending before arbitral boards. These claims would 
have little chance of success under domestic U.S. takings law.81 Yet 
regulatory takings claims under NAFTA Chapter 11 have led to at 
least one significant settlement. 
In Ethyl Corp. v. Government of Canada,82 Virginia-based Ethyl 
Corporation achieved a settlement providing for payment of dam-
ages and repeal of a regulation. Ethyl was the sole manufacturer of 
the gasoline additive MMT,83 used to reduce knocks in engines. The 
Canadian parliament became concerned about the possible health ef-
fects of MMT and enacted a ban on international and inter-
provincial trade in the substance. Ethyl filed a claim for arbitration 
under NAFTA in April 1997, asking for $250 million for expropriat-
ing anticipated profits and damage to its reputation based on parlia-
mentary debate before the ban was imposed. To settle the case, in 
July 1998 the Canadian government agreed to lift its ban on trading 
the fuel additive, paid Ethyl $10 million, and “issued a public state-
ment that [MMT] posed no health risk.”84 
 
 78. See, e.g., David A. Gantz, Potential Conflicts Between Investor Rights and Environ-
mental Regulation Under NAFTA’s Chapter 11, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 
2001), Part III.E (“Context and Process”), at 43–45 (manuscript on file with the George 
Washington International Law Review). 
 79. See infra note 232. 
 80. The actual number of cases filed for arbitration could be higher. The ICSID and its 
Additional Facility report a docket of pending arbitrations, but the UNCITRAL does not. See 
List of Pending Cases, supra note 43. In addition, cases could be settled before arbitration is 
formally begun. 
 81. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014–19 (1992); 
Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 
45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1369–71 (1993). 
 82. See Iris Winston, Fueling the Debate Over MMT in Gasoline, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Dec. 
19, 1997. 
 83. Methylcyclopentadienyl Manganese Tricarbonyl. 
 84. See Samrat Ganguly, Note, The Investor-State Dispute Mechanism (ISDM) and a Sov-
ereign’s Power to Protect Public Health, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L.113, 152 (1999). 
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There is already considerable criticism of the use of the investor-
state provisions in NAFTA to compensate regulatory takings, on the 
grounds that such use is an unwarranted infringement of national 
sovereignty.85 As a result of the Ethyl case and other arbitrations for 
regulatory takings filed against it, Canada has expressed displeasure 
with the current form of Chapter 11. According to BNA, there are 
indications that Canadian officials have asked the United States and 
Mexico for discussions to clarify the Chapter 11 guarantees and that 
such discussions are underway.86 Various top Canadian trade nego-
tiators have expressed concern about Chapter 11’s ambiguity and 
have said that none of the NAFTA parties had originally intended 
the provisions to be read so broadly. Some Canadians have said they 
hope the filing against the U.S. government in the Loewen case will 
help spur the United States to discuss clarifying Chapter 11.87 
IV. USING NAFTA TO COMPENSATE FOR A U.S. VERDICT: 
DENIALS OF JUSTICE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The broadly-worded guarantees of Chapter 11 give a foreign en-
tity that is situated similarly to Loewen respectable claims that state 
courts violated its NAFTA rights. The United States has long argued 
that nations should be liable for injustices committed in their courts, 
particularly in Latin American countries.88 Now the United States 
must deal with the consequences of this doctrine being applied to its 
own courts. This Part explores features of the U.S. civil justice sys-
tem that might be held to violate international law. 
As Loewen’s claims indicate, there are at least three provisions of 
NAFTA that may be invoked as a result of a judicial decision: (1) the 
obligation to treat investors from other NAFTA Parties no less fa-
vorably than its own investors (Article 1102), also known as the 
“nondiscrimination principle”; (2) the obligation to treat another 
NAFTA Party’s investors “in accordance with international law, in-
cluding fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security” 
 
 85. See generally id. 
 86. See U.S. Awaits Coming of “Millennium Round” of WTO Negotiations, 16 INT’L 
TRADE REP. (BNA) 103 (Jan. 20, 1999) (reporting that the Canadian government has indi-
cated displeasure with NAFTA Chapter 11 and in particular the Ethyl Corp. outcome); 
NAFTA, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 112 (Jan. 20, 2000) (reporting that NAFTA signato-
ries had held a number of working group meetings to discuss clarification of Chapter 11). 
 87. See Panel Expected, supra note 19, at 81. 
 88. See infra text accompanying notes 96–99. 
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(Article 1105), known as the “minimum standard of treatment”; and 
(3) the obligation not to nationalize or expropriate the investments 
of another NAFTA Party’s investors unless this is done for a public 
purpose, in a nondiscriminatory way, with due process under 
international law, and paying fair market compensation (Article 
1110). The discussion that follows will focus on the second of these 
claims, the “minimum standard of treatment” required by Article 
1105. That minimum standard underlies Article 1110 claims for 
expropriation and also has much in common with Article 1102 
claims about discriminatory treatment. 
A. The Definition of “Denial of Justice” 
The minimum standard of treatment for aliens is related to what 
is known in international law as “denial of justice.” “Denial of jus-
tice” is, however, much easier to state than to define. One promi-
nent jurist has called this doctrine “one of the oldest and one of the 
worst elucidated in international law.”89 As background to the dis-
cussion that follows, it is important to have some idea of how inter-
national law is made. In developed legal systems, there are definite 
means of identifying the law, such as reference to the constitution, 
statutes, and judicial decisions. Generally speaking, there is a well-
defined hierarchy among them. However, the international arena 
lacks a hierarchical structure of institutions, and the problem of find-
ing the law is much more complicated. Many accept the list of 
sources of international law enumerated in Article 38(1) of the Stat-
ute of the International Court of Justice.90 The Article lists “interna-
tional conventions” (treaties); “international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law”; “the general principles of law rec-
ognized by civilized nations”; and “judicial decisions and the teach-
ings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law” (the latter re-
ferring to the works of learned writers).91 
 
 89. Charles de Visscher, Le déni de justice en droit international, 52 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 369, 369 (1935 II) (translated by author); see also A.O. Adede, A Fresh Look at the 
Meaning of the Doctrine of Denial of Justice Under International Law, 14 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 
73 (1976). For the early history of the concept, see Hans W. Spiegel, Origin and Development 
of Denial of Justice, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 63 (1936). 
 90. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 36 (7th rev. ed. 1997). 
 91. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1); see also Maurice Mendelson, 
4LET-FIN.DOC 2/22/01  8:19 PM 
229] International Pressure to Harmonize 
 249 
Treaties are of growing importance in international law, but of-
ten they themselves refer to established principles of international law 
that are drawn from other sources. An example is the “minimum 
standard of treatment” in NAFTA Article 1105.92 The second cate-
gory, customary law, can be found in several sources. These include 
the actual practice of states—embodied in, among other things, cor-
respondence with other states and the advice each state receives from 
its legal advisers—the decisions of international tribunals, and writ-
ings of international lawyers.93 (There is considerable overlap in the 
categories listed in Article 38(1).) The third category, general princi-
ples of law, may involve principles specific to the international system 
or principles of domestic law common to most systems. Issues in-
volving procedure, including denial of justice, tend to draw more 
heavily on domestic law principles.94 As for the fourth category, in-
cluding judicial decisions, in international law there is no formal stare 
decisis doctrine as known in common law countries, but interna-
tional tribunals nearly always take previous decisions into account.95 
A cluster of scholarship on denial-of-justice claims appeared in 
the 1930s, when expropriations were more common, and the topic 
continued to be of interest through the mid-1970s.96 Recently there 
has been little, most likely because the numbers of expropriations 
have fallen.97 In the earlier part of this century, there was consider-
able conflict between lesser-developed countries and capital-
exporting countries over how the term was to be defined. Americans 
 
The International Court of Justice and the Sources of International Law, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 63–89 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 
1996). 
 92. See supra text accompanying notes 46–48. 
 93. See MALANCZUK, supra note 90, at 39. 
 94. See S. Verosta, Denial of Justice, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, Installment 1, 1007–10 (R. Bernardt ed., 1992). 
 95. See MALANCZUK, supra note 90, at 51. My colleague Raj Bhala argues that there is 
de facto a stare decisis doctrine in certain areas of international law and that this should be rec-
ognized de jure. See Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law 
(Part One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845, 849–52 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Prece-
dent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1 (1999). 
 96. See sources cited supra note 89 and infra note 104. 
 97. But see scholarship on the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the Libyan expropriations 
(especially Pat Norton in the American Journal of International Law), and the ELSI case (es-
pecially Sean D. Murphy, The ELSI Case: An Investment Dispute at the International Court of 
Justice, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 391 (1991)), which involved other kinds of expropriation. 
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and British tended to define the term as broadly as possible, to in-
clude all sorts of injuries by whatever branch of government. Latin 
American writers, on the other hand, tended to define the term quite 
narrowly. In their view, it encompassed only denials of access to the 
courts; actual procedures and results could not be questioned. The 
Latin American view culminated in the “Calvo doctrine,” after the 
Argentinean Carlos Calvo, who formulated it. According to Calvo, 
“aliens who establish themselves in a country are certainly entitled to 
the same rights of protection as nationals, but they cannot claim any 
greater measure of protection.”98 The view was that once access to 
the courts had been granted to a foreigner in the same manner in 
which it would be granted to a native, there could be no claim of 
denial of justice.99 
The phrase “denial of justice” has been used in three senses. In 
the broadest sense, the phrase “seems to embrace the whole field of 
State responsibility, and has been applied to all types of wrongful 
conduct on the part of the State toward aliens.”100 This might in-
clude conduct by the executive and the legislature as well as the judi-
ciary. In the narrowest sense, the phrase is “limited to refusal of a 
State to grant an alien access to its courts or a failure of a court to 
pronounce a judgment.”101 There is also an intermediate sense, in 
which the phrase “is employed in connection with the improper ad-
ministration of civil and criminal justice as regards an alien, including 
denial of access to courts, inadequate procedures, and unjust deci-
sions.”102 The first special rapporteur, charged with drafting a code 
on state responsibility to aliens for the International Law Commis-
sion, concluded that the intermediate sense was the most appropri-
ate. It described a “particular . . . wrong for which no other adequate 
phrase exists” in the law103 and, presumably, was broad enough to 
encompass a variety of wrongdoing by the courts. 
It will be seen that this “intermediate sense” of denial of justice 
encompasses both procedural and substantive wrongdoing by the 
 
 98. 6 M. CHARLES CALVO, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 231 (5th ed. 1896) (translation 
by author). 
 99. See Adede, supra note 89, at 78–79. 
 100. F.V. GARCÍA-AMADOR ET AL., RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 180 (1974). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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court—both improper procedures and unjust decisions. This dual 
definition of denial of justice has become widespread in this cen-
tury—in scholarly debate, in attempts to codify the law of state re-
sponsibility to aliens, and in arbitral decisions. One of the most in-
fluential treatises on denial of justice states that “steady international 
practice . . . . as well as the overwhelming preponderance of legal au-
thority, recognizes that not only flagrant procedural irregularities 
and deficiencies may justify diplomatic complaint, but also gross de-
fects in the substance of the judgment itself.”104 
B. Denial of Procedural Justice 
Much of what used to fall under the rubric of denials of proce-
dural justice is now part of international human rights law and 
mainly concerns criminal cases.105 Nevertheless, there are also proce-
dural obligations to aliens in civil cases. One respected treatise writer 
 
 104. ALWYN V. FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR 
DENIAL OF JUSTICE 309 (Kraus Reprint Co. 1970) (1938). One of the most prominent cases 
to make a distinction between procedural and substantive injustice, and to claim that interna-
tional law prohibits both, was the Cotesworth and Powell case (Great Britain v. Colombia), in 2 
JOHN BASSETT MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO 
WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 2050 (1898) (the case, however, used the 
term “denial of justice” for procedural injustice alone and the term “notorious injustice” for 
substantive injustice). Other sources supporting the dual definition of denial of justice include 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 178–82 
(1965); F.V. GARCÍA-AMADOR, DRAFT ARTICLES ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE FOR 
INJURIES CAUSED IN ITS TERRITORY TO THE PERSON OR PROPERTY OF ALIENS, arts. 5–8; Ad-
ede, supra note 89, at 76, 91 (submitted to the International Law Commission, 1957–1961) 
(reprinted in GARCÍA-AMADOR ET AL., supra note 100, at 139, 179–99). The Third Restate-
ment of Foreign Relations Law is considerably vaguer on the subject of denial of justice. The 
Third Restatement simply provides, in section 712, titled “State Responsibility for Economic 
Injury to Nationals of Other States,” that 
[a] state is responsible under international law for injury resulting from: 
(1) a taking by the state of the property of a national of another state that 
(a) is not for a public purpose, or 
(b) is discriminatory, or 
(c) is not accompanied by provision for just compensation; . . . or 
. . . . 
(3) other arbitrary or discriminatory acts or omissions by the state that impair prop-
erty or other economic interests of a national of another state. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 (1987). 
Comments to the Restatement briefly note that there is a relationship between economic injury 
and denial of justice and mention the requirement in international law that an “impartial de-
termination” be made in the case of a taking. Id. cmt. j. 
 105. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 711 cmt. a (1987). 
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observes that “[i]n a general way, the conduct of a trial with palpable 
injustice or in violation of the settled forms of law or of those rules 
for the maintenance of justice which are sanctioned by international 
law warrants diplomatic interposition.”106 These rules include, for ex-
ample, the obligations to provide an alien access to the courts; to re-
frain from judicial action without giving an alien a hearing and time 
to prepare a defense; to allow an alien to produce evidence or to 
summon important witnesses; and to resolve the case with reasonable 
dispatch.107 To be a violation of international law, a procedural defi-
ciency must have “prejudiced materially the alien’s defense” or 
claim.108 
1. Partiality of state judges and juries 
Especially significant regarding claims about American judgments 
are two internationally-recognized procedural rights: the right to an 
impartial tribunal109 and to freedom from unfair discrimination 
against the alien because of alienage.110 (Note the close relationship 
between the latter aspect of denial of procedural justice and the non-
discrimination principle under NAFTA Article 1102.) The decisions 
of international tribunals concerning the right to an impartial court 
have tended to focus on executive pressure on the judiciary,111 but 
 
 106. EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 338 
(1922); see also Harvard Research in International Law, The Law of Responsibility of States for 
Damage Done in Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, Article 9, 23 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 133 (1929) (denial of justice includes “gross deficiency in the administration of judi-
cial or remedial process”). 
 107. See GARCÍA-AMADOR, supra note 104, art. 7; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 181 (1965); FREEMAN, supra note 104, at 
267–68. 
 108. FREEMAN, supra note 104, at 269. 
 109. See Wheelock case, 4 JOHN BASSET MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 769 
(1906); GARCÍA-AMADOR, supra note 104, art. 7 (requirement of an “independent tribunal”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 181(a) 
(1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 
cmt. j (1987); Fabiani case, 5 JOHN BASSET MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 4878 
(1903). 
 110. See FREEMAN, supra note 104, at 268–69. 
 111. See The R.E. Brown claim (United States v. Great Britain 1923), NIELSON’S 
REPORT 163, 198 (1926); Fabiani case, supra note 109, at 4877, 4882, 4901; Idler v. Vene-
zuela (United States v. Venezuela 1885), 4 JOHN BASSET MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 
3491, 3516 (1898). 
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there is no logical reason why a denial-of-justice claim might not also 
be based on partiality toward a litigant in the absence of executive 
pressure, particularly if that partiality is due to financial incentives. It 
could be argued that some American state court judges, such as the 
Mississippi trial judge and appellate judges in the Loewen case, are 
not impartial but rather favor the plaintiff and (perhaps more signifi-
cantly) the plaintiff’s lawyer for reasons connected with judicial elec-
tions and campaign financing.112 
The problem of bias is not the same in all American courts; the 
incentives of federal and state judges are somewhat different. There 
is a large literature on the relative merits of federal and state 
courts.113 These scholars are addressing the question of whether state 
courts are capable of adequately enforcing federal rights and of de-
ciding diversity cases.114 Many writers have concluded that state 
judges are quite capable of handling these cases; a sizable contingent 
has argued the opposite.115 However, scholars on both sides employ 
mostly abstract arguments and do not explore in detail the pressures 
on state judges created by processes such as judicial elections. If they 
discuss judicial elections at all, they tend do so at an abstract level. 
But the specific forces in judicial election campaigns that operate on 
the ground are crucial to understanding the incentives of state 
judges.116 This section explores these incentives and the impact they 
 
 112. Interestingly, Loewen did not make this argument in its Notice of Claim. 
 113. The debate was given a great boost by an article written by Burt Neuborne in the 
late 1970s. See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). 
 114. The debate over diversity jurisdiction is discussed in more detail infra Part VI.B. 
 115. There is a good summary of the literature in a recent article by Brett Gerry. See Brett 
Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of State and Lower Federal 
Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 233, 245–52 (1999). 
 116. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, The Meaning of Federalism, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1365, 
1376 (1997) (briefly noting that judicial elections may make it difficult for judges to take a 
countermajoritarian position; in symposium on Fear and Federalism); Judith Resnik, Trial as 
Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 
971, 1014 (2000) (briefly noting that judicial elections may make it difficult for judges to take 
a countermajoritarian position). Two notable exceptions are Hans A. Linde, The Judge as Po-
litical Candidate, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (1992); Brittain Shaw McInnis, Comment, The 
$75,000.01 Question: What Is the Value of Injunctive Relief?, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1013, 
1024–30 (1998). Also, the death penalty literature has spawned interest in judicial elections. 
See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Patrick K. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Be-
tween the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759 (1995); 
Norman Redlich et. al., Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due Process 
Survive the Perceived Political Pressure?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 280–98 (1994). 
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could have on U.S. liability under international law. 
The daily practice of many lawyers indicates that local bias is a 
problem in certain areas. Empirical studies surveying lawyers confirm 
anecdotal evidence.117 One study found that over fifty percent of de-
fense lawyers reported bias against out-of-staters in their state cases. 
Over a quarter of plaintiffs’ lawyers admitted this bias.118 Lawyers for 
out-of-state defendants readily acknowledge that suits brought in 
certain areas of particular states command a “settlement premium” 
because of the native bias of judges and juries in these areas.119 To 
collect this premium or a higher verdict, plaintiffs’ lawyers take 
elaborate care to lay venue in one of these areas. The plaintiffs’ bar 
also acknowledges that it often prefers to bring claims in state rather 
than federal court. Willie Gary himself, the plaintiffs’ lawyer in the 
Loewen case, has said he generally brings his cases in state court and 
prefers that venue; he vigorously tries to defeat defendants’ efforts to 
remove cases to federal court.120 
A few elected state judges have been remarkably candid about 
the pressures they face. Formerly chief justice of the West Virginia 
 
 117. See Kristin Bumiller, Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases: Analysis of a Survey and Im-
plications for Reform, 15 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 749, 761–62 (1981) (finding that local bias was a 
significant factor in rural districts). 
 118. See Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Di-
versity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 409, 411 (1992) (finding 
bias especially pronounced in southern states). 
 119. This point about settlement premiums is widely acknowledged in the literature 
aimed at practitioners but not so much discussed in academic literature. See, e.g., Kevin J. 
Conway et al., Evaluation of a Premises Liability Case for Purposes of Settlement or Trial, Illinois 
Institute for Continuing Legal Education, Premises Liability (Main Handbook) § 10.8 (noting 
that venue is an important consideration in evaluating a case for settlement; history of settle-
ments and verdicts in various possible venues should be carefully researched); Susan M. Karten, 
Evaluation of a Plaintiff’s Case from the Plaintiff’s Perspective, 613 PRAC. L. INST. 7, 9 (1999) 
(noting that venue is an important consideration in evaluating a case for settlement); Anthony 
Scirica et al., Debate: Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 577, 585–86 (1997) (re-
marks of Thomas Gottschalk, general counsel of General Motors: “Settlement costs are driven 
up by the threat of punitive damages awarded by juries sitting in these pro-plaintiff venues.”); 
Beth Shapiro, Evaluation of a Defendant’s Case from a Defendant’s Perspective, 613 PRAC. L. 
INST. 15, 19 (1999) (noting that venue is an important consideration in evaluating a case for 
settlement). 
 120. “Mr. Gary said he prefers state courts and no wonder: With their local judges and 
juries, a state courtroom can be more familiar ground for lawyers used to pursuing compensa-
tion for injured workers or other similar plaintiffs. And it is decidedly unfriendly terrain for a 
large corporation.” McKay, supra note 20, at B1 (emphasis added); see also Coca-Cola Files to 
Have Second Race-Bias Suit Moved to Federal Court, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2000, at B7 (de-
scribing Coca-Cola’s efforts to remove a $1.5 billion suit filed by Willie Gary to federal court 
and Mr. Gary’s intention to fight removal). 
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Supreme Court of Appeals and currently a plaintiffs’ lawyer, Richard 
Neely—who gave an affidavit for Loewen submitted with its notice 
of claim—wrote several books while he was still a judge that de-
scribed the incentives of state judges faced with out-of-state defen-
dants. Based on many years’ experience as a state elected judge and 
on discussions with numerous elected judges from other states, he 
described how elected judges depend on local support to win and 
keep a seat on the bench. Neely put it this way: 
As long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state 
companies to injured in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. 
Not only is my sleep enhanced when I give someone else’s money 
away, but so is my job security, because the in-state plaintiffs, their 
families, and their friends will reelect me.121 
While he was a judge, Neely was rather careful in his books to 
avoid the topic of campaign contributions by lawyers. His Loewen 
affidavit, written since he has become a plaintiffs’ lawyer, is more ex-
plicit on the subject. (Of course, Neely most likely did not write the 
affidavit for free.) Neely said, because of his experience and numer-
ous discussions over the years with elected judges from other states, 
that the judicial campaign contributions of plaintiffs’ lawyers are 
typically generous. “[T]he lawyers who regularly represent plaintiffs 
in personal injury, class action and toxic tort cases contribute hand-
somely to judicial campaigns.”122 This is so because contingency fees 
give plaintiffs’ lawyers a direct personal stake in the outcome of trials. 
“A judge can allow a plaintiffs’ lawyer to retire early in life on a 
handsome income with one discretionary ruling! When multi-million 
dollar judgments are involved, a judge’s decision not to set aside a  
 
 
 
 121. RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS: HOW BUSINESS CAN BE 
RESCUED FROM THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 4 (1988). 
Obviously, in any elected system there is a strong temptation to decide cases in favor 
of the local folks who vote, rather than in favor of the out-of-state folks who do not. 
State judicial races (particularly at the appellate level where elections are statewide) 
are increasingly becoming high-profile, high-cost, media events. When this occurs, 
judges must raise money from somebody. Unfortunately, it is a rare judge who is so 
well loved that he can raise money from everyone in an evenhanded way. In fact, 
well-loved judges can’t raise money from anyone at all. Litigants don’t want judges 
who will be intelligent and fair; litigants want judges who will decide cases their way. 
See id. at 24. 
 122. Neely Opinion, supra note 57, at 5. 
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punitive damage award may make a plaintiff’s lawyer millions of dol-
lars after taxes.”123 
Defense lawyers, in contrast, are usually paid by some method 
that is independent of the outcome of a case. Consequently, they 
have less of a personal stake in currying favor with judges. “Although 
the defense bar can put together numerous modest and reluctant 
contributions, the plaintiffs’ bar will cheerfully provide large individ-
ual contributions to their friends on the bench.”124 In a state like 
Mississippi that has officially nonpartisan elections, campaign contri-
butions, ironically, are especially important. Candidates cannot rely 
for support on party affiliation but must become known by spending 
a great deal of money.125 Local businesses can somewhat counteract 
the plaintiffs’ bar’s contributions because they too contribute to ju-
dicial campaigns and have a certain presence in the community. But 
out-of-state defendants are relatively defenseless. Neither they nor 
their lawyers contribute substantial sums, nor do they typically em-
ploy many people in the local community.126 In addition to the in-
centives of elected judges, juries in certain areas have strong populist 
and local biases.127 The result is large verdicts in favor of in-state 
plaintiffs against out-of-state defendants.128 Other sources, examining 
the effects of contributions on judicial campaigns in Texas, Alabama, 
and Philadelphia, corroborate Neely’s account.129 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. at 4. There is no conflict between this conclusion and the Helland and Tabar-
rok studies; Helland and Tabarrok lumped together all forms of judicial selection that did not 
involve partisan elections, including merit plan appointments and retention elections. 
 126. See id. at 5–6; NEELY, supra note 121, at 45 (“When all litigants live, vote, hire 
workers, and pay taxes in the same jurisdiction, the tension between firm rules and necessary 
flexibility can be kept within reasonable bounds. . . . In-state defendants are often protected by 
local juries, but out-of-state defendants have nothing to rely upon but a firm set of legal 
rules.”). 
 127. See Neely Opinion, supra note 57, at 4 (“The populist disposition of juries in many 
Mississippi judicial districts makes Mississippi an attractive venue for high-stakes tort litiga-
tion . . . .”). 
 128. See NEELY, supra note 121, at 15, 24–17, 45. 
 129. See, e.g., WINTHROP E. JOHNSON, COURTING VOTES IN ALABAMA (1999) (describ-
ing how the 1994 campaign for seats on the Alabama Supreme Court became a battle between 
plaintiffs’ lawyers and business interests); Pamela Willis Baschab, Putting the Cash Cow Out to 
Pasture: A Call to Arms for Campaign Finance Reform in the Alabama Judiciary, 30 CUMB. L. 
REV. 11, 17–18 (2000); Congress, Judicial Conference Mull Changes to Class Action, Mass Tort 
Rules, 67 U.S.L.W. 2723, 2723 (June 8, 1999) (describing views that “[s]tate courts are the 
forum of choice for plaintiffs’ attorneys . . . because they can capitalize on the political good-
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Empirical work covering a broader geographical range—the en-
tire United States—also corroborates Neely’s account. Until re-
cently, empirical work on jury awards did not focus on the factors of 
in-state plaintiffs and out-of-state defendants, nor on judicial elec-
tions.130 Recent studies by Eric Helland and Alexander Tabarrok 
 
will with their local elected judges.”). Several Texas Supreme Court justices accepted campaign 
contributions of nearly $400 thousand from lawyers representing Pennzoil and Texaco during 
their famous $11 billion lawsuit. Some of the justices who accepted contributions were not 
even up for reelection. Sheila Kaplan, Justice for Sale, COMMON CAUSE MAG., May/June 
1987, at 29–32. In that case, in-state Pennzoil won a massive judgment against New York-
based Texaco, and the Texas Supreme Court refused to reduce the appeal bond, effectively 
denying Texaco an appeal. The Dallas Morning News described how judges often heard cases 
argued by major contributors and even key fundraisers; lawyers frequently contributed money 
to a judge’s campaign just days before their cases were due to be heard by that judge. See Mark 
Edgar & Steve McGonigle, Judges Routinely Hear Contributors’ Cases, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, Mar. 22, 1987, at A1. A survey, which was supervised by the Texas Supreme Court and 
to which 51% of Texas judges responded, indicated that 48% of judges “considered campaign 
donations to be ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ influential” in affecting judges’ decisions. Osler McCarthy, 
Campaign Gifts Sway Judges, 48% Say in Poll, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN, June 10, 1999, at B1. 
A two-year study of Philadelphia’s municipal and common pleas courts found that attorneys’ 
judicial campaign contributions were linked to favorable decisions. H.G. Bissinger & Daniel R. 
Biddle, Politics and Private Dealings Beset the City’s Justice System, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, 
Jan. 26, 1986; see also HARRY P. STUMPF & JOHN H. CULVER, THE POLITICS OF STATE 
COURTS 43–45 (1992); Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Account-
ability in Highest State Courts, L. & COMTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 75, 105–06; Roy A. 
Schotland, Elective Judges’ Campaign Financing: Are State Judges’ Robes the Emperor’s Clothes 
of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57 (1985). 
 130. Much empirical work has tended to focus on overall rates of punitive damages, with 
many authors arguing that punitive damages are neither as frequent nor as high as the popular 
view. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 5; Rustad, supra note 5; Theodore Eisenberg et al., The 
Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 623–24 (1997); ERIK MOLLER, 
RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS SINCE 1985, xviii 
(1996). Others are concerned about the effects of punitive awards in certain areas of substan-
tive law and about the unpredictability of punitive awards. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Cost of 
Punitive Damages Against Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285 
(1988); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (With Notes on Cognition and 
Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2078–79 (1988); ERIC MOLLER ET AL., RAND 
INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN FINANCIAL INJURY JURY VERDICTS 22 
(1997). 
  Previous empirical work did tend to show that mean jury awards in most categories 
of cases are vastly higher than median awards. In one study, which drew from a sample of the 
nation’s 75 largest counties in 1992, the median jury verdict (for all categories, not just tort) 
was $50,000, while the mean was $735,000. See Galanter, supra note 5, at 1133–35; see also 
David Luban, A Flawed Case Against Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 359, 361 (1998) 
(summarizing studies). This suggests that there are in effect two damage systems in the coun-
try; a small world of very high damage awards and a larger one of lesser awards. It could be 
argued that drawing samples from the nation’s largest counties may underestimate jury ver-
dicts, since some of the largest awards will probably come from rural areas where county popu-
lation is low and populist feeling is strong. Of course, the statistics on jury awards are probably 
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show that where judges are elected in partisan contests the average 
tort award in a case involving an in-state plaintiff and an out-of-state 
defendant is 42% higher than in states that do not use partisan judi-
cial elections.131 The studies attempted to correct for differences in 
state law by examining diversity jurisdiction cases in federal court. 
The authors calculate that two-thirds of the 42% difference is due to 
bias against out-of-state defendants and the rest to generally higher 
awards against businesses in states that use partisan judicial elec-
tion.132 In explaining their findings, Helland and Tabarrok point to 
the likely powerful influence of trial lawyer donations to judicial 
campaigns.133 The Texas Court of Appeals has stated, in a case in 
which billions of dollars were awarded against an out-of-state corpo-
ration, that “[i]t is not surprising that attorneys are the principal 
source of contributions in a judicial election,” and that “[a] candi-
date for the bench who relies solely on contributions from 
nonlawyers must reconcile himself to staging a campaign on some-
thing less than a shoestring.”134 In response to the out-of-state de-
fendant’s argument that Texas judges who received campaign con-
tributions from the plaintiff’s lawyers should have recused 
themselves, that court stated: “If a judge cannot sit on a case in 
which a contributing lawyer is involved as counsel, judges who have 
been elected would have to recuse themselves in perhaps a majority 
of the cases filed in their courts.”135 
Various rulings by the elected trial judge in the Loewen case sug-
gest that the judge was not impartial and may well have been af-
fected by the dynamic explained above. The judge did not attempt 
to control plaintiff’s lawyer Mr. Gary in his numerous references to 
 
misleading as to what is actually happening in the legal system because the pressure to settle 
certain cases is immense; most of the most pro-plaintiff cases presumably never go to a jury. 
This would probably be especially true where the plaintiff is an in-state individual, the defen-
dant an out-of-state corporation, the venue is known for populist juries, and the judges are 
elected. 
 131. Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Tort 
Awards, Independent Institute Working Paper #1 (visited Feb. 16, 2001) <http://www.inde-
pendent.org/tii/WorkingPapers/ElectoralInstitutions.pdf> [hereinafter Electoral Institutions]; 
see also Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort 
Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157, 177–83 (1999) [hereinafter Court Politics]. 
 132. Helland & Tabarrok, Electoral Institutions, supra note 131, at 28–29. 
 133. Id. at 6-7; Helland & Tabarok, Court Politics, supra note 131, at 158–61. 
 134. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W. 2d 768, 843 (Tex. App. 1987), cert. dis-
missed, 485 U.S. 994 (1987). 
 135. Id. 
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race, wealth, and Canadian citizenship, despite repeated objections 
by defense counsel. Indeed, during a bench conference, the judge 
suggested that references to race were fair game,136 although race 
had nothing to do with the issues in the case and both the parties 
were white. The trial judge also apparently did not consider 
Loewen’s motion to reduce excessive punitive damages before he en-
tered judgment, which was arguably required under the Due Process 
standards set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Pacific Mutual Life 
Insurance Co. v. Haslip.137 Even apart from the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s standards, basic fairness or the appearance of propriety 
would have suggested a hearing on the issue of reduction of punitive 
damages in a case of Loewen’s magnitude. 
Perhaps most telling was the trial court’s handling of compensa-
tory damages. After their initial deliberations, the jurors came in with 
a verdict of $260 million. A note from the foreman explained that 
they intended $100 million in compensatory damages and $160 mil-
lion in punitive damages.138 At that point, the judge said that the 
trial had to be bifurcated between the compensatory and punitive 
damages phases, as had been agreed before trial but had not been re-
flected in his instructions.139 The judge then, on the basis of the 
foreman’s note and overruling Loewen’s motion that the jury be 
polled, reformed the jury verdict to consist of $100 million in com-
pensatory damages.140 The punitive damages phase then began. The 
plaintiffs, in their complaint, had asked for $26 million in compensa-
tory damages.141 Mississippi rules provide that “final judgment shall 
not be entered for a monetary amount greater than that demanded 
in the pleadings or amended pleadings,”142 so the judge actually re-
formed the jury verdict to an amount inconsistent with Mississippi 
law. 
Although hard data are lacking, adding a defendant’s foreign na-
tionality to the mix would likely exacerbate the usual problems with 
 
 136. See Transcript, supra note 22, at 3595–97. 
 137. 499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
 138. See Transcript, supra note 22, at 5739. 
 139. See id. at 5752–53. 
 140. See id. at 5753. 
 141. See Third Amended and Supplemental Complaint, Jeremiah J. O’Keefe, et al. v. The 
Loewen Group, Inc., et al., No. 91-67-423 (Cir. Ct., 1st Judicial Dist. Hinds County), at 79–
82. 
 142. MISS. R. OF CIV. P. 54(c) (1999). 
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out-of-state defendants.143 (It should be noted that under the 
NAFTA minimum treatment standard there is no precondition for 
recovery that a foreign defendant be treated worse than a U.S. one. 
If the tribunal is impermissibly partial, it does not matter whether it 
is more partial in a case involving an alien or not.)144 Plaintiffs’ law-
yers would have an even easier target, being able to play on national-
ist as well as local prejudices. 
2. Efforts by counsel to stir up prejudice 
Indeed, the Loewen case and several others suggest plaintiffs’ 
lawyers take full advantage of the additional opportunities presented 
by a foreign defendant.145 The Mississippi jury may well have been 
moved by what appear to have been plaintiff’s counsel’s frequent ref-
erences to Loewen’s Canadian connections as well as racial and class 
matters. In this area, as in others, the United States has brought 
claims against Latin American countries for similar problems in their 
courts. In several international arbitrations, inflammatory and preju-
dicial remarks at trial about defendant’s citizenship were held to have 
violated international law. For instance, the Cuban trial of an Ameri-
can was held to have violated international law in part because it was 
conducted with “long political harangues” that were irrelevant and 
prejudicial.146 A Panamanian trial was also found to have violated in-
 
 143. See Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and Mod-
ern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction Over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 1, 39–40 (1996). Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg have done an empirical study 
suggesting that xenophobia is not “rampant in American courts.” Kevin M. Clermont & Theo-
dore Eisenberg, Commentary, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120, 
1121 (1996). On the contrary, they find that foreign plaintiffs and defendants win substantially 
more often than domestic litigants. Id. However, their data comes exclusively from federal civil 
cases and therefore says nothing about possible bias in state court. This data indicating lack of 
bias in federal court does suggest that removing state cases would be beneficial. 
 144. The minimum standard of treatment under NAFTA Article 1105 is independent of 
the requirement of equal treatment under Article 1102. See supra text accompanying notes 46–
48. 
 145. See, e.g., Haryanto v. Saeed, 860 S.W.2d 913, 927–28 (Tex. App. 1993) (Robert-
son, J., dissenting) (quoting closing argument playing on nativist themes); Brits Discover North 
Carolina, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1997, at A18 ($600 million verdict awarded against British 
company in Meineke muffler franchise case; jurors were told that the British defendant is a 
“foreign company preoccupied with one thing: Money,” and the jurors needed to “send a 
message to foreign companies”). 
 146. In the Matter of Jennie M. Fuller (United States v. Cuba), 1971 FOREIGN CLAIMS 
SETTLEMENT COMMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 53, 58–
59. See also 8 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 720 (1967). 
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ternational law because the Panamanian government “denounced” 
the United States during the trial and “improperly went out of [its] 
way to excite hostility” against the American defendant.147 In that 
case, the United States-Panama Claims Commission concluded that 
the trial had been influenced by “strong local sentiment”:148 
The Commission cannot avoid the conclusion . . . that the claim-
ant’s conviction was unconsciously influenced by strong popular 
feeling . . . . The unavoidable susceptibility of local judges to local 
sentiment is a matter of common knowledge. One of the primary 
purposes of international arbitration is to avoid just such suscepti-
bility, and to remedy its consequences.”149 
C. Denial of Substantive Justice 
1. Unjust decisions 
Foreigners such as Loewen also may bring claims based on denial 
of substantive justice. This is not an easy standard to meet. Interna-
tional law sources agree that mere error in a decision is not enough 
to constitute a denial of substantive justice. Gross defects in the sub-
stance of the judgment must exist.150 Most scholars and arbitral pan-
els have taken a position similar to that of the British government in 
the R.E. Brown claim: 
Even if the Honorable Arbitrators may think that if they had been 
sitting as members of the High Court of the South African Repub-
lic . . . they would have arrived at a different decision, that is not 
sufficient to constitute a denial of justice entitling an International 
Tribunal to award compensation. A decision does not constitute a 
denial of justice unless it is so obviously wrong and unjust that no 
court could honestly have arrived at such a conclusion.151 
 
 147. Solomon v. Panama (United States v. Panama), 6 R.I.A.A. 370, 373 (1933). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 479–81. 
 150. See FREEMAN, supra note 104, at 319. 
 151. Answer of the British Government in the R.E. Brown Claim, quoted in NIELSEN’S 
REPORT 252 (1926). See, e.g., The Texas Company Claim, Decision 32-B, AMERICAN 
MEXICAN CLAIMS REPORT, 142, 143 (1948) (“palpable injustice in the administration of law” 
violates international law); BORCHARD, supra note 106, at 340; Harvard Research in Interna-
tional Law, supra note 106 (“manifestly unjust judgment” violates international law); Adede, 
supra note 89, at 91. 
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This standard in effect uses the substantive injustice as indirect 
evidence of partiality or corruption in the tribunal. This limitation 
would seem to be necessary to prevent undue interference with a na-
tion’s sovereignty, discussed in more detail below. 
The United States has repeatedly endorsed the view that denials 
of justice include manifestly unjust decisions. In the Denham Claim 
against Panama, the United States argued that “a nation is responsi-
ble for the manifestly unjust decisions of its courts.”152 Earlier in U.S. 
history, the U.S. Secretary of State wrote that judicial decisions vio-
late international law “when palpable injustice had been done, or a 
manifest violation had been committed of the rules and forms of 
proceeding.”153 Alexander Hamilton also seems to have had this un-
derstanding of international law.154 
The United States has benefited from this view of international 
law in several arbitrations, once again particularly those involving 
Latin American countries. For example, in the Rihani Claim 
(United States v. Mexico), an international arbitral panel held that a 
“clear and notorious injustice” violates international law.155 There-
fore, an international arbitral panel may “put aside a national deci-
sion presented before it” and “scrutinize its grounds of fact and 
law.”156 In that case, an international commission reviewed a decision 
by the Mexican Supreme Court in a civil case and found it to be 
“such a gross and wrongful error as to constitute a denial of jus-
tice.”157 In Bronner v. Mexico (United States v. Mexico), an interna-
tional umpire awarded compensation to a claimant whose goods had 
been confiscated by Mexican customs authorities.158 A Mexican court 
had decided that the confiscation was allowable, but the umpire 
found that the decision was “so unfair as to amount to a denial of 
 
 152. Denham Claim (United States v. Panama 1933), HUNT’S REPORT 491, 506 
(1934). 
 153. Letter from Mr. Forsyth, Secretary of State, to Mr. Welsh, Mar. 14, 1835, in 6 
JOHN BASSETT MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 696 (1906). 
 154. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 1, at 476–77. 
 155. Rihani Claim, Decision 27-C, AMERICAN MEXICAN CLAIMS REPORT 254, 257 
(1948). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Bronner v. Mexico (United States v. Mexico 1874), 3 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, 
HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED 
STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 3134 (1898). 
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justice.”159 
A NAFTA tribunal has actually addressed allegations that the 
Mexican courts denied justice to U.S. investors in Azinian v. United 
Mexican States.160 In that case, a unanimous ICSID Additional Facil-
ity panel discussed the possibility of challenging a court’s decision as 
a violation of NAFTA. The panel’s consideration of the subject was 
not central to the decision, since the claimant had not directly al-
leged such a violation. But the panel addressed the issue because it 
did not want to be perceived as closing off a claim because of im-
proper pleading.161 While NAFTA arbitration decisions do not have 
formal precedential value as in a common law system, the decision of 
such a panel is some indication of the approach other panels might 
take. 
In Azinian, a group of American investors formed a California-
based company called Desechos Solidos de Naucalpan 
(“DESONA”). The company bid on the management of a solid-
waste landfill in Naucalpan de Juarez, Mexico. After spending $3 
million on bidding and negotiation, the company entered into a fif-
teen-year contract with the municipality. Shortly afterward, the mu-
nicipality nullified the agreement. The principals of DESONA filed a 
claim against the Mexican government under NAFTA, alleging 
breaches of NAFTA Articles 1105 (minimum standard of treatment 
for foreign investors: compliance with international law) and 1110 
(unlawful expropriation) and seeking over $17 million in damages.162 
The Mexican government contended that nullification of the agree-
ment was justified because the contract was invalid from the start 
under Mexican law governing public service contracts. (The contract 
was by its terms subject to Mexican law and to the jurisdiction of 
Mexican courts.) DESONA brought claims against the municipality 
in Mexican courts. After testing by three court levels, the Mexican 
courts declared that the municipality was justified in nullifying the 
contract for invalidity. 
 
 159. Id.; see also the Burt Case (United States v. Great Britain 1923), NIELSEN’S REPORT 
588, 596–97 (1926) (international tribunal held the result of a property adjudication by the 
Fiji Islands’ Board of Land Commissioners to be unjust and ordered that the claimant receive 
just compensation). 
 160. ICSID AF No. ARB(AF)/97/2 (ICSID-AF Arbitral Trib. 1999) (visited Feb. 16, 
2001) <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/robert_award.pdf> [hereinafter Azinian]. 
 161. See Azinian, para. 101. 
 162. The arbitration panel consisted of Benjamin R. Civiletti, former Attorney General of 
the United States; Claus von Wobeser of Mexico; and Jan Paulsson of France, who presided. 
4LET-FIN.DOC 2/22/01  8:19 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
264 
The panel was at pains to emphasize it was not reviewing the 
Mexican court decisions as if it had plenary appellate jurisdiction. It 
insisted the DESONA claimants must show “either a denial of jus-
tice, or a pretence [sic] of form to achieve an internationally unlawful 
end.”163 The award said denial of justice occurs if courts “refuse to 
entertain a suit, if they subject it to undue delay, or if they administer 
justice in a seriously inadequate way”164 or if they engage in a “clear 
and malicious misapplication of the law.”165 (The latter, the panel 
noted, would seem to overlap with the notion of “pretence of form” 
masking a violation of international law.)166 
The Azinian panel concluded that the findings of the Mexican 
courts could not possibly be considered arbitrary, let alone malicious. 
As an example, the panel examined one of the twenty-seven irregu-
larities upheld by the Mexican courts as a cause for nullifying the 
contract: that the municipality was misled about DESONA’s ability 
to perform the contract. Examining the record in some detail, the 
panel found ample evidence of material misrepresentations by 
DESONA before the contract was signed. The panel determined that 
claimants had failed to make the necessary showing that “the evi-
dence for this finding was so insubstantial, or so bereft of a basis in 
law, that the judgments were in effect arbitrary or malicious.”167 
2. Excessive damages 
An important problem with some American civil verdicts is the 
huge amount of damages awarded, especially punitive damages. The 
Loewen case serves as an example. An award of excessive damages 
could be a denial of substantive justice under international law. This 
conclusion is reached by analogy to the international law approach to 
criminal cases: courts are said to violate international law when they 
impose unreasonably harsh sentences on aliens.168 Citing these prin-
 
 163. Azinian, para. 99. 
 164. Azinian, para.102. This definition was taken from the Harvard study. 
 165. Azinian, para. 103. 
 166. Azinian, para. 103. 
 167. Azinian, para. 105. 
 168. See, e.g., Bonhomme Case, 18 BRIT. AND FOR. STATE PAPERS 341–440 (1831); Dy-
ches Claim (United States v. Mexico), OPINIONS OF THE COMMISSIONERS 193, 197 (1929); 
Quintanilla Claim (Mexico v. United States 1926), OPINIONS OF THE COMMISSIONERS 136, 
138 (1927); Solomon v. Panama, 6 R.I.A.A. 370, 479–81 (1933); FREEMAN, supra note 104, 
at 348–51; 8 WHITEMAN, supra note 146, at 348–49 (claimant, who had been arrested for 
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ciples, the U.S. government has taken the position that a judgment 
in a civil case that was disproportionate to the underlying breach of 
legal duty is a denial of justice under international law.169 Punitive 
damages, in particular, are suspect under international law. Most 
countries do not recognize punitive damages at all.170 Those that do 
allow punitive damages in some circumstances are concerned about 
the size of awards in the United States.171 There is also concern 
about large awards for emotional distress or pain and suffering.172 
These differences in treatment of damages between the United States 
and other justice systems have been a major stumbling block to the 
development of a Hague Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Judgments. Other countries are frightened at the pros-
pect of being required to enforce large U.S. punitive and compensa-
tory damages, while the United States considers these to be 
important.173 But international law “may be ascertained . . . by the 
general usage and practice of nations,”174 and, regarding these issues, 
 
breach of public decency in company with Portuguese students, was sentenced to be publicly 
whipped and banished, unlike Portuguese companions). 
 169. See Denham Claim (United States v. Panama 1933), HUNT’S REPORT 491, 506 
(1934). 
 170. See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Punitive Damages and the Recognition of Judgments, 43 
NETH. INT’L. L. REV. 143, 165, 168 n.150 (1996); Cortese & Blaner, supra note 6, at 152; 
Takeshi Kojima, Cooperation in International Procedural Conflicts: Prospects and Benefits, 57 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 64 (1994). 
 171. See, e.g., RICHARD H. KREINDLER & JUDITH L. HOLDSWORTH, TRANSNATIONAL 
LITIGATION: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE, at CAN-82 (1997) (Canada would not enforce 
“[a]wards of punitive damages on the scale seen in some American jurisdictions”). Even the 
U.S. Supreme Court has said that punitive damages must be proportionate to the harm done. 
See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568, 574–75 (1996) (ruling that 
punitive damages of 500 times compensatory damages awarded in Alabama trial were so 
“grossly excessive” as to violate Fourteenth Amendment). 
 172. See, e.g., Baird v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 491 F. Supp. 1129, 1149 (N.D. Tex. 
1980) (“However similar the laws of Texas and Canada may be with regard to compensatory 
damages, they are widely divergent in the areas of compensation for pain and suffering.”); Re 
the Enforcement of a U.S. Judgment, 3 INT’L LITIG. PROC. 430, 437–38 (1992) (German 
court refuses to recognize U.S. award for pain and suffering). See also the Warsaw Convention, 
prohibiting pain and suffering awards in airplane crash cases. 
 173. See Paul R. Beaumont, A United Kingdom Perspective on the Proposed Hague Judg-
ments Convention, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 75, 109 (1998) (pointing out that one of the “larg-
est obstacles to a successful Hague Convention” is “dealing with what some Member States 
regard as excessive damages awards,” which has been a bone of contention between the United 
States and Europe); Friedrich K. Juenger, A Hague Judgments Convention?, 24 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 111, 113 (1998). 
 174. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820); see also supra text ac-
companying notes 91, 94. 
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many countries have adopted standards different from those in the 
United States. 
3. Jury verdicts 
The fact that an award was made by a jury does not exempt it 
from the international rule that nations are liable for denials of jus-
tice in their courts. “The jury, after all, is but a particular kind of ac-
cessory in a chosen mechanism of judicial administration, a link in 
the chain of justice which is ultimately open to inspection in all its 
constituents by the processes of international law.”175 Judges and ju-
ries “are inseparable parts of the judicial organ, and for the act of ei-
ther when it constitutes a denial of justice the state, it would seem, 
should be equally responsible.”176 
D. Denial of “Fair and Equitable Treatment” 
The basic denial of justice standard is heightened under NAFTA 
Chapter 11 by inclusion of a “fair and equitable treatment” require-
ment in Article 1105. This is another of the provisions favored by 
capital-exporting nations to protect their investments. The NAFTA 
requirement was taken from the Model United States Bilateral In-
vestment Treaty (“BIT”) and is found in several actual BITs. This 
standard is intended to provide additional protection beyond the 
normal baseline under international law.177 Under “fair and equitable 
treatment” provisions, treaties are supposed to be interpreted in a 
manner most favorable to the investor.178 Some commentators be-
lieve the standard goes much further in protecting foreign invest-
ments than the international minimum standard.179 Thus, it is argu-
able that even if a foreigner fails to make a persuasive claim of denial 
of justice it would be protected by the “fair and equitable treatment” 
standard. 
 
 175. FREEMAN, supra note 104, at 363. 
 176. J.W. Garner, International Responsibility of States for Judgments of Courts and Ver-
dicts of Juries Amounting to Denial of Justice, 10 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 181, 185 (1929). 
 177. See KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY 
AND PRACTICE 2, 76 (1992). 
 178. See K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties: Comments on 
Their Origin, Purposes, and General Treatment Standards, 4 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 105, 125 
(1986). 
 179. F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 52 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 241, 244 (1981). 
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E. Exhaustion of Local Remedies 
These standards for denial of justice and fair and equitable treat-
ment may suggest that international law sharply restricts state sover-
eignty by carefully probing judicial decisions. However, state sover-
eignty is in part preserved by a threshold requirement for bringing an 
international claim: a claimant must have exhausted local remedies. 
(This rule applies only to acts by a state that injure private parties and 
not to acts by a state that directly injure another state.)180 Besides 
limiting international interference with national sovereignty, which 
spares interstate friction, the rule spares the resources involved in 
litigating a claim in an international forum when national courts 
might have provided redress instead.181 Domestic tribunals therefore 
perform an international function in the sense of providing the first 
phase of enforcement of international law. 
It is possible that the United States government in its response to 
Loewen’s Notice of Claim is arguing an exhaustion of local remedies 
problem as a basis for the NAFTA panel’s lack of jurisdiction.182 
However, according to the analysis in this section, such a claim likely 
will not prove successful. 
The usual requirement for exhaustion of local remedies is that 
“[t]he alien must have unsuccessfully pursued all available modes of 
appellate revision and have been brought face to face with a defini-
tive pronouncement of the highest judicial body before such a com-
plaint will be receivable.”183 In seeking review, a claimant is required 
to use “reasonable diligence.”184 An alien need not try to resort to 
extraordinary judicial remedies. The rule does not apply where there 
are no regularly constituted courts to which access is open and prac-
tical.185 
 
 180. See de Visscher, supra note 89, at 425; FREEMAN, supra note 104, at 405. 
 181. See FREEMAN, supra note 104, at 416. 
 182. See supra text accompanying note 44. 
 183. FREEMAN, supra note 104, at 415; see also Ambatielos Case, 12 R.I.A.A. 82 (1956); 
Adede, supra note 89, at 76 n.16; A.O. Adede, A Survey of Treaty Provisions on the Rule of Ex-
haustion of Local Remedies, 18 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (1977); Ivan L. Head, A Fresh Look at the 
Local Remedies Rule, 5 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 142 (1967). 
 184. FREEMAN, supra note 104, at 423. 
 185. Stelio Séfériadès, Le problème de l’accès des particuliers à des juridictions internation-
ales, 51 RECUEIL DES COURS 5 (1935). 
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1. Appeal bond requirements 
This last exception—for cases where access to the courts is not 
practical—may be very important for aliens bringing denial-of-justice 
claims against the United States. Appeal bond requirements in some 
southern states are high and serve to restrict access to appeal.186 The 
problem famously arose in the 1987 Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.187 
case, in which a Texas jury found a $10.53 billion verdict against 
New York-based Texaco and Texaco was required to post an appeal 
bond of over $13 billion in order to have the case heard by the Texas 
Supreme Court.188 Loewen found itself in a similar predicament. It 
argues that it was effectively denied an appeal to the Mississippi Su-
preme Court because of the appeal bond requirement of 125% of the 
judgment—$625 million in Loewen’s case. Loewen claims that it 
was not possible for it to finance this sum, neither through issuing 
new debt nor through issuing new securities.189 Loewen filed mo-
tions with both the trial court judge and the Mississippi Supreme 
Court to reduce the amount of the bond. Both courts are authorized 
under Mississippi law to reduce the amount of the bond for “good 
cause.” Both courts ruled there was not good cause for any reduc-
tion in the bond.190 Loewen, therefore, was faced with a set of 
unpalatable options: spending over $200 million, unrecoverable, to 
try to finance the appeal bond; not posting the bond and allowing 
O’Keefe to begin levying on its assets in a week; or settling the case. 
Loewen chose the last option and settled for $175 million. If 
 
 186. The Florida legislature, however, has recently limited its appeal bond requirement. 
This was done in order to prevent private litigation from bankrupting tobacco companies, who 
are also subject to a suit by the state. See Milo Geyelin, Florida Passes Measure Aiding Tobacco 
Firms, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2000, at B16; Milo Geyelin & Gordon Fairclough, Taking a Hit: 
Yes, $145 Billion Deals Tobacco a Huge Blow, But Not a Killing One, WALL ST. J., July 17, 
2000, at A1. 
 187. 481 U.S. 1 (1987). 
 188. Id. at 4–5. 
 189. Issuing new debt would have violated covenants with existing creditors, making 
$736 million immediately due and payable. Issuing new securities, Loewen says, would have 
cost at least $200 million for the first two years, and the company could have recovered virtu-
ally none of these costs even if it had been successful on appeal. See Loewen’s Notice of Claim, 
supra note 34, at 43–44. 
 190. See id. at Appendix at A1078 (trial judge); Appendix at A1176 (Mississippi Supreme 
Court). The Mississippi courts’ decisions not to reduce the bond requirement were unusual in 
U.S. jurisprudence; typically courts do not require a full bond to be posted based on punitive 
damages if such a requirement would potentially bankrupt the company. See, e.g., Olympia 
Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 786 F.2d 794, 796–97 (7th Cir. 1986); Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 314 F. Supp. 94, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
 
4LET-FIN.DOC 2/22/01  8:19 PM 
229] International Pressure to Harmonize 
 269 
chose the last option and settled for $175 million. If Loewen’s alle-
gations are true, it is likely that an international tribunal would de-
cide that access to the Mississippi Supreme Court was not “open and 
practical” under the circumstances. 
2. Petitions for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court 
Ordinarily, a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court 
might be required to exhaust local remedies under international law. 
U.S. constitutional violations are arguably involved, and a potential 
remedy for such violations is in the U.S. Supreme Court. If the 
treatment of an alien was so grave as to possibly constitute a denial of 
justice under international law, it almost certainly implicates the Due 
Process Clause and perhaps other guarantees of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Although petitions for certiorari are rarely granted, an attempt 
may still be required under international law, even if the remedy does 
not have a good chance of success.191 The normal requirement of pe-
titioning to the U.S. Supreme Court becomes problematic, however, 
if a high state court appeal bond prevents normal review in state 
courts. 
Before addressing the issue of procedural obstacles, it is worth 
considering the chances of success on the merits for a petition based 
on the Due Process Clause in a case such as Loewen’s. Claims under 
the Due Process Clause might include the excessiveness of the puni-
tive damages award, the impropriety of elected judges presiding over 
cases involving out-of-state defendants (or of electing judges gener-
ally), and the unfairness of the appeal bond requirement. To put the 
matter succinctly, none of these claims is especially likely to succeed. 
First, as noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to inter-
fere to any great extent with punitive damage awards in state 
courts.192 Although the Court did set out some guidelines for con-
trolling punitive damages in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,193 
commentators tend to agree that these guidelines are vague and pro-
vide little concrete guidance for state and lower federal courts to fol-
 
 191. “[T]he mere expectation that an injustice will be done by the courts is not enough 
to excuse a party’s failure to test out remedies which are presumably sufficient.” FREEMAN, 
supra note 104, at 421. See also Letter from Mr. Olney to Mr. Hamlin, July 16, 1896, in 6 
MOORE, supra note 153, at 272. 
 192. See supra note 7. 
 193. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
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low.194 Empirical studies have shown that punitive damage awards 
have not been significantly affected by BMW v. Gore thus far,195 and 
the U.S. Supreme Court has shown itself unwilling to venture into 
the foray again recently. In Loewen’s particular case, the “guide-
posts” set out in BMW v. Gore do not necessarily indicate the U.S. 
Supreme Court would reverse the decision below.196 Looking at the 
second factor, the disparity between harm to the plaintiff and the 
punitive damages award, the Court noted that in an earlier case it 
had found that a punitive damages award of more than four times 
the amount of compensatory damages was “close to the line” but 
was not unconstitutional.197 In any case, the Court refused to set a 
mathematical formula.198 The punitive damages award in Loewen 
was four times the amount of compensatory damages. 
Second, the Supreme Court has not questioned the constitution-
ality of electing judges. Commentators have been increasingly vocif-
erous in arguing that electing judges denies litigants their due proc-
ess right to an impartial tribunal, at least under certain circumstances 
such as when lawyers or parties have made contributions to a judge’s 
campaign.199 An ad hoc ABA committee has even recommended spe-
cific new rules for disqualification of judges resulting from contribu-
tions to judges’ election campaigns.200 But the U.S. Supreme Court 
 
 194. See supra note 7. 
 195. See id. 
 196. The guideposts included “the degree of reprehensibility of the nondisclosure; the 
disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by [plaintiff] and his punitive damages 
award; and the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in 
comparable cases.” 517 U.S. at 575. 
 197. Id. at 581 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1991)). 
 198. Id. at 582. 
 199. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the 
Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Ad-
judicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 498 
(1986); Stuart Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign 
Contributions, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449, 463 (1988); Leonard A. Bennett, Comment, The Impos-
sibility of Impartiality: Interest in Judicial Reelection as a Denial of Due Process for a Criminal 
Defendant, 4 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 275 (1994); Mark Andrew Grannis, Note, Safe-
guarding the Litigant’s Constitutional Right to a Fair and Impartial Forum: A Due Process Ap-
proach to Improprieties Arising from Judicial Campaign Contributions from Lawyers, 86 MICH. 
L. REV. 382 (1987); Scott D. Wiener, Note, Popular Justice: State Judicial Elections and Pro-
cedural Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187, 189 (1996). 
 200. See ABA Ad Hoc Comm. on Judicial Campaign Finance, Am. Bar Ass’n, Report to 
the House of Delegates (May 5, 1999) (visited Feb. 12, 2001) <http://www.abanet.org/ 
cpr/adhoc599.html>. These would require a judge to disqualify himself or herself in instances 
when a party or party’s lawyer has contributed a threshold amount to the judge’s campaign. See 
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has not weighed in. Various cases hold that a judge who has a finan-
cial interest in the outcome of the case, even an indirect interest, is 
not sufficiently impartial for constitutional purposes.201 But, beyond 
expressing a certain distaste for judicial elections,202 the U.S. Su-
preme Court has not held that elected judges must recuse themselves 
even if they have received campaign contributions from the parties or 
lawyers before them. It is of course possible that the Court might so 
hold but certainly not predictable. In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 
the Court stated that most matters relating to judicial disqualification 
do not rise to a constitutional level and that disqualification because 
of bias would only be required in extreme cases.203 And, indeed, the 
Texas Supreme Court cited Lavoie in declining to hold that a judge 
should be disqualified under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution because opposing counsel made a $10,000 contribu-
tion to the judge’s campaign.204 
Third, on the question whether the Mississippi appeal bond re-
quirement is constitutional, it seems likely the Supreme Court would 
not find a violation. The Court has repeatedly stated that appeals are 
not required under the U.S. Constitution at all, for either criminal or 
civil cases.205 However, if an appeal is provided by a state, the ave-
nues of appellate review “must be kept free of unreasoned distinc-
tions”206 under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. In 
 
id. Proposed Canon 3(E)(1). 
 201. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522–23 (1927) (holding unconstitutional system 
in which adjudicator, the town’s mayor, received compensation each time he convicted a de-
fendant but nothing if he acquitted); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972) 
(holding unconstitutional system in which adjudicator, the town’s mayor, received no compen-
sation from convictions, but the town received the proceeds of fines resulting from convic-
tions). Other cases involving the concern that adjudicators be reasonably free from bias or risk 
of bias are collected in Wiener, supra note 199, at 191 n.25. 
 202. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400–01 (1991) (addressing voting rights 
question in the context of a judicial election, stating: “The fundamental tension between the 
ideal character of the judicial office and the real world of electoral politics cannot be resolved 
by crediting judges with total indifference to the popular will while simultaneously requiring 
them to run for elected office.”). 
 203. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821 (1986). Aetna held that a justice 
of the Alabama Supreme Court was not disqualified under the Due Process Clause for harbor-
ing dislike of insurance companies but was disqualified because he should not decide a legal 
issue that would stand as precedent in another pending case in which the same justice was a 
litigant. Id. at 824–25. 
 204. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 844–45 (Tex. 1987). 
 205. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 110 (1996). 
 206. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966). 
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civil cases, this has come to mean two things. First, financial barriers 
must not be imposed on an indigent appellant in cases involving a 
fundamental right, such as divorce or termination of parental 
rights.207 Second, much higher barriers may not be imposed on cer-
tain specific classes of litigants, such as tenants appealing eviction de-
cisions.208 The Loewen case would appear to fall into neither of these 
categories. In general, the Court has held that financial restrictions 
on appeal in civil cases are not unconstitutional.209 
There is thus not a substantial likelihood of success on the merits 
for a litigant such as Loewen before the U.S. Supreme Court. But 
before the merits are even reached in the Court, there are a number 
of procedural hurdles to overcome in a case like Loewen’s. The Su-
preme Court has its own exhaustion of local remedies rule in the 
form of 28 U.S.C. § 1257. This statute governs petitions for writ of 
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court from decisions of state courts. 
Two prerequisites must be met before review is possible. First, a sub-
stantial federal question must be properly raised in the state court 
proceedings for the U.S. Supreme Court to have jurisdiction.210 The 
Court has enforced this requirement tenaciously. Loewen did make 
federal constitutional arguments to the Mississippi courts in its mo-
tions to reduce the appeal bond211 and so overcame this first hurdle. 
Second, § 1257 only provides for petitions from “[f]inal judgments 
or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a deci-
sion could be had.” The Court has been more flexible about this fi-
nality requirement than the federal question requirement. It has 
given the finality requirement a “practical rather than a technical 
construction.”212 For its jurisdictional purposes, “final” means a state 
court judgment that conclusively disposes of a matter that is distinct 
 
 207. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 113. See also Henry v. First Nat’l Bank of Clarksdale, 595 
F.2d 291, 299–305 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding district court decision granting relief from re-
quirement of filing bond pending appeal of Mississippi state court judgment because case in-
volved First and Fourteenth Amendments and Civil Rights Act of 1871). 
 208. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 79 (1972). 
 209. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 
656, 660 (1973); M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 114–16. 
 210. See, e.g., Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 439 (1969). This requirement goes 
back to interpretations given to section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. See cases cited in 
Crowell v. Randell, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 368, 391–98 (1836). 
 211. See Motion for Stay of Enforcement of Final Judgment Pending Appeal, in 
Loewen’s Notice of Claim, supra note 34, at Appendix A838. 
 212. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). 
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from the general subject of the litigation and affects only the parties 
to the particular controversy.213 (This is similar to the collateral order 
doctrine that applies to petitions for review of lower federal court 
decisions.) 
A litigant such as Loewen could argue that an order of the high-
est state court denying reduction of the appeal bond is a collateral 
decision reviewable under § 1257. Some members of the U.S. Su-
preme Court, however, have been strict about the finality require-
ment in the context of an appeal bond. According to them in Penn-
zoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., the loser’s right not to be arbitrarily denied 
an appeal could be “adequately vindicated even if Texaco were 
forced to file for bankruptcy” when judgment was executed because 
the loser failed to file the ($13 billion) appeal bond.214 
By contrast, an international tribunal, under the “open and prac-
tical” standard, would not likely view bankruptcy as necessary to ex-
haust local remedies. In order to petition the Supreme Court for a 
writ of certiorari before execution of the judgment, a defendant 
would have to apply to the Court for an emergency stay of enforce-
ment proceedings. International law may well view this as an ex-
traordinary remedy and therefore unnecessary to exhaust local reme-
dies. 
The bottom line is that in ordinary cases a foreign litigant proba-
bly must petition for certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court to satisfy 
the exhaustion of local remedies rule under international law. But in 
the case of a high state appeal bond, this may not be necessary. To 
be on the safe side, alien litigants should take care to raise all con-
ceivable federal issues at the state level, including NAFTA issues, 
where there is a question of an appeal bond. 
F. Federal Responsibility for State Denials of Justice 
There is little doubt that the United States could be held respon-
sible for denials of justice on the part of a state. Article 105 of 
NAFTA provides: “The Parties shall ensure that all necessary meas-
ures are taken in order to give effect to the provisions of this Agree-
 
 213. See Clark v. Williard, 292 U.S. 112, 117–19 (1934); Mercantile Nat’l Bank v. 
Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 557–58 (1963) (invoking jurisdiction over Texas Supreme Court 
order that had improperly interpreted a federal statute dealing with the venue of suits against 
national banks). 
 214. 481 U.S. 1, 18 (1987) (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., concurring); see id. at 28 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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ment, including their observance, except as otherwise provided in 
this Agreement, by state and provincial governments.” The U.S. 
Statement of Administrative Action on NAFTA declares that “no 
country can avoid its commitments under the Agreement by claim-
ing that the measure in question is a matter of state or provincial ju-
risdiction.”215 This was also the understanding of the U.S. Trade 
Representative at the time NAFTA was approved.216 In this respect, 
NAFTA codifies basic principles of international law: federal respon-
sibility for a political subdivision’s acts is well established.217 The U.S. 
State Department recognized this principle when it refused to argue 
that the United States was not liable for the misconduct of Texas of-
ficials; when the United States had similar claims, “we have invariably 
insisted on the liability of the Federal Government although the fail-
ure . . . was chargeable to the officials of one of the constituent 
states or provinces.”218 
V. PROBLEMS WITH HOLDING THE U.S. RESPONSIBLE FOR 
DENIALS OF JUSTICE 
The U.S. legal system indeed suffers from problems that have so 
far proved resistant to internal efforts at reform. But the NAFTA 
cure may be worse than the disease. It could seriously undermine the 
sovereign ability of the United States to distribute power within a 
federal system and to organize its civil justice system. The success of 
Loewen-type claims threatens sovereignty with two categories of 
problems: first, problems when international bodies of any sort make 
awards compensating for U.S. judgments and, second, problems spe-
cific to arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11. 
 
 215. H.R. DOC. NO. 103-159, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., v. 2, at 5 (1993). 
 216. See Letter from Michael Kantor, supra note 52. 
 217. See 2 ROBERTO AGO, Third Report on State Responsibility, Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 
199, 257 (1971) (“The attribution to a federal State of the acts of organs of its component 
states, in cases where such acts enter into consideration at the international level as a source of 
responsibility, is also a firmly established principle.”); see also International Law Commission, 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 4, (visited Feb. 21, 2001) <http://www.un.org/ 
ilc/index.htm>. 
 218. Political Subdivisions, 5 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 527, 594 (1943); see also DeGalvan Claim (Mexico v. United 
States), OPINIONS OF THE COMMISSIONERS 408 (1927). 
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A. Traditional Concerns About Interfering With Judgments 
Since the 1930s at least, the traditional concerns about an inter-
national tribunal holding a country liable for decisions of its courts 
have been downplayed. These concerns are likely to resurface in the 
wake of international agreements such as NAFTA. They may not be 
powerful enough to justify eliminating denial-of-justice claims from 
international grounds of action, but they do counsel caution in the 
way these claims are handled. 
International tribunals have traditionally been reluctant to review 
judgments for three main reasons. First, local law was assumed to en-
sure the “separation and independence” of the judiciary from the 
government.219 The government was therefore thought to have no 
control over actions of the judiciary, so holding the government li-
able was pointless. Also, because this separation supposedly freed the 
judiciary from political concerns, its judgments were less suspect than 
other governmental actions. Second, “respect for the finality of judi-
cial decisions” counseled against upsetting these decisions.220 Third, 
second-guessing judicial decisions would interfere with the internal 
organization of a country’s government, and in particular with prin-
ciples of federalism.221 Are these reasons still valid? 
1. The separation and independence of the judiciary 
The first principle, the separation and independence of the judi-
ciary from the government, depends on a notion that the govern-
ment is distinct from the state. For Europeans, “the government” 
suggests political involvement and direct responsibility to the elec-
torate, whereas “the state” suggests officials who are more apolitical 
and permanent.222 But in the United States, “state” and “govern-
ment” are largely viewed as interchangeable terms, and, in interna-
tional law, the distinction between government and state is likewise 
ceasing to matter. The former president of the International Court 
of Justice has pointed out that “[a]lthough independent of the Gov-
ernment, the judiciary is not independent of the State: the judgment 
 
 219. Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century 
278 RECUEIL DES COURS (1978). 
 220. Id. 
 221. See FREEMAN, supra note 104, at 36. 
 222. European judges, for example, often insist that they are not part of the government, 
although they serve the state. 
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given by a judicial authority emanates from an organ of the State in 
just the same way as a law promulgated by the legislature or a deci-
sion taken by the executive.”223 
One might still say that a rationale behind this distinction be-
tween government and state remains valid: that judges are in fact 
relatively free from political pressure and impartial compared to other 
branches and so can be better trusted not to discriminate against 
outsiders. So, it could be argued, the distinction should be resur-
rected and judgments should be treated differently from other acts. 
In this view, 
It is true that courts are organs of the nation; but they are not its 
organs in the sense in which the executive and the legislature are. 
The executive and the legislature represent the expression of its 
will. The courts of justice represent the colorless and impartial ex-
pression of justice in the interpretation of its will.224 
However, this approach poses several difficulties. It is hard to argue 
that the judiciary is “colorless and impartial” in places—like Missis-
sippi—where judges are elected. Elected judges begin to look more 
like political officials, responsible to the electorate (and to their cam-
paign contributors).225 Furthermore, the American use of juries as 
fact-finders in civil cases means that judges are not the only group to 
be considered. Through juries, in theory, the electorate speaks di-
rectly. Tocqueville said that the American jury was “as direct and ex-
treme a consequence of the dogma of the sovereignty of the people 
as universal suffrage.”226 Juries are supposed to inject into decisions 
of courts an element of popular common sense, to temper the aloof-
ness of the judiciary. American fact-finders are thus closer to popular 
opinion and the European idea of “the government.” American ju-
 
 223. Jiménez de Aréchaga, supra note 219, at 278. 
 224. THOMAS BATY, THE CANONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 127–28 (1930). Interna-
tional tribunals have sometimes adopted this view. In one example, the Yuille, Shortridge & 
Co. case, the British government brought a claim on behalf of a company for losses in a judg-
ment of a Portuguese court. The Senate of Hamburg, chosen to adjudicate the claim, declared 
it to be “altogether unjust to require the Royal Government of Portugal to answer for the mis-
conduct of its court,” since these courts were “completely independent of the Government and 
the latter was consequently unable to exert any influence over their decisions.” 2 ALBERT DE 
LAPRADELLE & NICHOLAS POLITIS, RECUEIL DES ARBITRAGES INTERNATIONAUX 78, 103 
(1923). 
 225. See supra text accompanying notes 122–35. Even appointed judges in the United 
States are relatively political, in part because of the way in which they are appointed. 
 226. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 273 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969). 
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ries are, however, independent of “the government” in the American 
sense because they are not regular officials. Those who highly prize 
this independence greatly resent attempts to interfere with it through 
international arbitration. 
Even in situations where the judiciary is formally separate and in-
dependent, judges are connected to political processes. Though 
separate from the legislature and executive, judges are still bound to 
apply local statutes and carry out the legislature’s will. Therefore, the 
ultimate source of a judgment that violates international law may 
well be an act of the legislature. This suggests that national responsi-
bility for the acts of the judiciary should not be entirely excused. 
Perhaps instead that responsibility should be reduced by placing a 
greater burden on the claimant to show that a decision is unjust. 
2. Respect for the finality of judicial decisions: Res judicata 
Arguably, respect for the finality of judicial decisions should bar 
international litigation of the basis for a judgment. A judgment is an 
especially potent expression of sovereignty. It is usually clothed in 
great dignity, and it often represents considerable investment of state 
resources into a decision of particular questions between specific par-
ties. At some point, litigants are entitled to certainty. These tradi-
tional concerns of res judicata doctrine similarly pertain if several 
sovereigns are involved. The U.S. constitutional doctrine of Full 
Faith and Credit,227 for example, preserves judgments from collateral 
attack in a multi-state system. While Full Faith and Credit jurispru-
dence gives states wide latitude in deciding whether or not to apply 
other states’ laws,228 it strictly requires recognition of other states’ 
judgments. Under the Full Faith and Credit doctrine, states must 
recognize another state’s judgment even if that judgment was based 
on a clear legal mistake (involving a different state’s law, no less).229 
Expense is spared and interstate friction is reduced by the impossibil-
ity of second-guessing another state’s judgment. 
There are several responses to this argument (that a doctrine re-
sembling res judicata should apply in international cases involving 
prior national court decisions).230 First, the parties to an international 
 
 227. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1. 
 228. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). 
 229. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908). 
 230. A doctrine of res judicata does exist regarding earlier international cases. 
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arbitration are different from the parties to the original action. In the 
case of traditional arbitration between states, the parties would be 
entirely different, although one state would be bringing claims on 
behalf of the injured national. Second, international arbitration in 
general is powerless to affect the original judgment. The judgment 
stands, so the relationship between the original parties is not af-
fected. Third, the legal issues are usually different. The courts in the 
original action are ordinarily concerned with questions of purely in-
ternal law, whereas the only question an international arbitral panel 
asks is whether an international obligation was violated. 
But these responses are less than satisfying. Regarding the par-
ties, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel as opposed to res judi-
cata (or issue preclusion as opposed to claim preclusion), the parties 
need not be the same.231 Regarding the legal issues, the court hear-
ing the original dispute may decide questions of international law, 
incorporated into national law. It could be argued that those issues 
should have been raised, because federal law includes treaties and the 
law of nations and state courts may decide most federal law issues. 
The better argument against applying preclusion principles to a 
national judgment is that there currently is no international forum 
available to monitor local courts’ compliance with international law. 
There is no court able to play a supervisory role in the international 
system, like the U.S. Supreme Court’s role in the U.S. system, able 
to ensure that the states comply with federal law. The Full Faith and 
Credit doctrine is applied as strictly as it is to require states to en-
force each other’s judgments in part because there is available this 
avenue of direct review in the U.S. Supreme Court. American states 
are all bound by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and by U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of that clause, so 
that a minimum baseline of due process is assured. (The states also 
have relatively similar legal standards.) The standards from nation to 
nation are different, so judgments (as to international law claims) at 
the national level should not be given preclusive effect at the interna-
tional level. However, considerations of finality counsel caution 
when international tribunals consider whether a national decision 
violates international law. 
 
 
 231. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
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3. Interference with traditional aspects of U.S. political organization: 
The civil justice system and federalism 
Perhaps the greatest problem with international denial-of-justice 
claims is that they could interfere with deep-rooted national political 
arrangements. In the case of the United States, these arrangements 
include specific aspects of the civil justice system and broader princi-
ples of federalism. International arbitration awards against the federal 
government based on state court denials of justice could provoke a 
backlash in the United States against international agreements like 
NAFTA and the budding Free Trade Agreement of the Americas.232 
The previous discussion of denial-of-justice claims listed four key 
features of American civil justice as possible violations: elected 
judges, jury awards, aggressive advocacy, and punitive damages. Each 
of these is supported by powerful interest groups and by many vot-
ers.233 They have tremendous symbolic significance and some practi-
cal impact on redistribution of wealth. A decision against the United 
States in a case like Loewen could raise the cry of interference with 
U.S. sovereignty and a democratically-chosen legal system. 
The federal government’s liability for state denials of justice un-
der international law may also cause strain in federal-state relations. 
States traditionally have been given considerable freedom in design-
ing their civil justice systems; dual sovereignty is very much alive in 
this area. But to prevent liability under NAFTA or other treaties, the 
federal government might well take steps that would affect state civil 
cases.   
a. Federal government suing states for indemnity under common 
law principles. One possible step is indemnity. The United States 
government might try to sue a state government for violating 
NAFTA obligations. It could seek indemnity under common law 
principles in the absence of a relevant federal statute. But recent Su-
preme Court precedent has been hostile toward creation of federal 
common law. Cases in which such creation is proper are “‘few and 
restricted’” and “extraordinary,”234 where a “‘significant conflict be-
 
 232. The famous demonstrations and riots that derailed WTO meetings in Seattle in De-
cember 1999 show the hostility that exists toward trade agreements and globalization in some 
quarters. See, e.g., John Burgess & Steven Pearlstein, Protests Delay WTO Opening, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 1, 1999, at A1; Steven Pearlstein, Trade Theory Collides With Angry Reality, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1999, at A1. 
 233. See the discussions of the reactions of ATLA and Public Citizen, supra notes 64–66. 
 234. O’Melveny & Meyers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87, 89 (1994) (quoting Wheeldin v. 
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tween some federal policy or interest and the use of state law.’”235 
This limitation contemplates creation of federal common law only to 
preempt state law, not to create a cause of action to indemnify the 
United States for a state’s wrongdoing. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has declined to use common law 
principles to provide indemnity for the United States. The United 
States has brought suit for indemnity under common law principles 
against private parties, and these suits have failed. In United States v. 
Standard Oil Co.,236 for example, a Standard Oil truck hit a U.S. sol-
dier, who was hospitalized and disabled for a period. The United 
States brought suit against Standard Oil, seeking compensation for 
medical services and wages the soldier received while incapacitated. 
The Supreme Court held that federal (and not state) law applied, but 
it would not create federal common law to provide indemnity. 
Whether to provide indemnity was a question only Congress could 
resolve, not the courts or the executive. Congress “is the custodian 
of the national purse” and “most often the exclusive arbiter of fed-
eral fiscal affairs. And these comprehend . . . securing the treasury or 
the government against financial losses however inflicted.”237 “Until 
it acts to establish the liability, this Court and others should with-
hold creative touch.”238 On separation of powers principles, there-
fore, the Court would not step in. It seems even less likely the Court 
would create federal common law to provide indemnity against a 
state, which would add complicated questions of federalism to the 
separation-of-powers concerns. 
b. Possible reactions by Congress. Congress might have the power 
to create such liability, however. It could conceivably do so under its 
powers to pay the debts of the United States and to regulate com-
 
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)). See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Struc-
tural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1250 (1996) (describing the Supreme 
Court’s approach “limit[ing] the scope of federal common law to several well-recognized en-
claves”). 
 235. O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 87 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 
63, 68 (1966)). 
 236. 332 U.S. 301 (1947). 
 237. Id. at 314–15. 
 238. Id. at 317. The Court cited United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) 32 (1812) (holding that federal courts may not punish common law crimes); see also 
United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954) (holding that United States may not recover 
indemnity from one of its employees after it had been held liable under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act for the negligence of the employee). See Clark, supra note 234, at 1361–68 (dis-
cussing separation-of-powers limitations on creation of federal common law causes of action). 
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merce with foreign nations.239 Even if Congress did not authorize a 
direct suit against states whose court systems violated NAFTA, it 
could exert pressure on such states through the Spending Clause not 
to commit further violations. For example, Congress could deduct 
the amount of any damages awarded against the United States from 
block grants to the offending state.240 Regardless of whether direct 
indemnity or indirect pressure was used, action by the U.S. govern-
ment against the states would create tension in the federal system. 
B. Problems with the NAFTA Mechanism: Procedures 
Besides the general problems with subjecting American judg-
ments to denial-of-justice claims, NAFTA’s specific mechanism for 
doing so is flawed.241 There are problems with subjecting govern-
 
 239. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 240. This would seem to be permissible based on the holding of South Dakota v. Dole, 
483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 241. A threshold issue, though beyond the scope of this article, should at least be men-
tioned: the possibility that NAFTA itself is unconstitutional under the Treaty Clause. See U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 2. NAFTA was approved using “fast-track” procedures involving majority 
votes of both the House and Senate, rather than a two-thirds vote of the Senate as the Treaty 
Clause specifies. 
  An original purpose of requiring a super-majority of the Senate to ratify treaties was 
to make it easier to block treaties that might affect state sovereignty and federalism. See Bruce 
Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 809–10 
(1995). There has been a lively academic skirmish on this topic in the Harvard Law Review. 
Professors Ackerman and Golove argued that a “constitutional moment” occurred in the 
1940s when the American people agreed to bypass the traditional treaty procedures in favor of 
giving President Roosevelt greater power to deal with the aftermath of World War II. This 
“constitutional moment,” the authors argue, was driven in part by American embarrassment at 
the Senate’s failure to ratify Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations treaty after World War I 
and by expanding federal power during the New Deal. Id. at 861–66. Professor Tribe heartily 
opposed this view of the Treaty Clause and, indeed, the method of constitutional interpreta-
tion in general. Tribe criticized the “prevailing view,” as characterized by the Third Restate-
ment, that a congressional-executive agreement “‘can be used as an alternative to the treaty 
method in every instance.’” Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections 
on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1250 (1995) 
(commenting on and quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. e (1987)); cf. Michael Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the 
(Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133 (1998). The most recent version of Professor Tribe’s 
treatise, however, grudgingly acknowledges that “the congressional-executive agreement ap-
pears for now to have found a settled place in United States foreign relations practice.” 1 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-4, at 656 (3d ed. 2000). The 
issue of NAFTA’s constitutionality is now being litigated in the Eleventh Circuit. Unions, in-
cluding the United Steelworkers of America, brought an action against the United States chal-
lenging the constitutionality of NAFTA. In July 1999, the district court decided that the 
President and Congress had power to make and approve the agreement using “fast-track” pro-
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ments to potentially large judgments based on international investor-
state arbitration under Chapter 11. The very features of the ICSID 
that make the forum so effective for basic commercial arbitration are 
ill-suited to address politically explosive issues central to sovereignty. 
These features include the composition of the arbitral panels, the se-
crecy of arbitration, and the lack of effective appellate review. 
1. The problem of arbitrator bias 
Arbitral panels under NAFTA normally follow the standard tri-
partite model of international arbitration.242 Unless the parties agree 
otherwise, the arbitral tribunal consists of three arbitrators. Each of 
the parties appoints one, and the third—who is the presiding arbitra-
tor—is appointed by agreement of the parties.243 If parties fail to 
agree or appoint an arbitrator, the Secretary General of ICSID ap-
points him or her. The Secretary General makes appointments from a 
roster of 45 arbitrators established by consensus of the NAFTA Par-
ties. A presiding arbitrator appointed by the Secretary General may 
not be a national of either of the parties.244 Decisions are reached by 
a majority of the panel.245 
One view is that arbitration is best thought of as an outgrowth of 
contract law, rather than as a form of adjudication.246 An inquiry into 
arbitration ought to determine what were the understandings and 
assumptions of the contracting parties, not whether it is “fair” or 
whether due process is provided. This conflicts with the notion in in-
ternational arbitration that the arbitrators, even those chosen by the 
parties, will be independent and impartial.247 This aspiration may be 
 
cedures. See Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (N.D. Ala. 
1999). Plaintiffs have appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. Union Announces Appeal in Case Chal-
lenging NAFTA, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1445 (1999).
  242. See Gantz, supra note 78, at 43–45. 
 243. See NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1123. 
 244. See id. art. 1124. 
 245. See The World Bank Group International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes, Schedule C, Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules, art. 25 (visited Oct. 26, 2000) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/33.htm> [hereinafter ICSID AF Rules]. 
 246. See Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 487 
(1997). 
 247. See INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, ETHICS FOR INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATORS arts. 3 (requirement of “impartiality and independence”), 5 (arbitrator should 
avoid ex parte communications with any party regarding the arbitration); GARY B. BORN, 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 63–71 (1994); W. 
LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION  
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unrealistic in practice. Even if an arbitrator chosen by one of the par-
ties has no professional or financial relationship with the party, she 
may still favor that party because of shared nationality or legal, politi-
cal, or economic outlook.248 This is viewed as an advantage because 
party-appointed arbitrators can ensure that the presiding arbitrator 
(or “president”) fully understands the issues at stake, the background 
of the case, and the implications of an award.249 But because these 
party-appointed arbitrators are a blend of judge and advocate, 
American arbitration rules do not hold them to the same standard of 
impartiality as arbitrators appointed in other ways.250 Moreover, 
many party-selected arbitrators seem to overplay their roles as advo-
cates. In choosing the party-appointed arbitrator, parties prefer a 
candidate who “‘knows just how far he can go in advocacy’ without 
losing all credibility with his colleagues.”251 
American courts have said that this tripartite model creates a 
neutral tribunal because biases in either direction are offset.252 
Though the president is supposed to have the controlling voice, she 
must obtain a majority to decide the case. Often tribunal presidents 
must bargain with one arbitrator or the other to arrive at a decision 
(or try to play the two party-appointed arbitrators off each other). 
The decision thus often differs from what the president would have 
decided alone.253 This process of negotiation and compromise may 
 
§§ 12.04, 13.03, 13.05 (3d ed. 2000); ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND 
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 201, 218–26 (2d ed. 1991). 
 248. See CRAIG ET AL., supra note 247, at 212, 233; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Party-
Appointed Arbitrator in International Controversies: Some Reflections, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 59, 
60, 69 (1995); William W. Park, Neutrality, Predictability and Economic Co-operation, 12 J. 
INT’L ARB. 99, 105 (1995). 
 249. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 
396 (1978); Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 WIS. L. REV. 3, 
36–37; Arnold M. Zack, Tripartite Panels: Asset or Hindrance in Dispute Settlement?, 
PROCEEDINGS, 34TH ANNUAL MEETING, NAT’L ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 273, 279 
(1982). 
 250. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, Rules 
12, 19. 
 251. Rau, supra note 246, at 508. 
 252. See, e.g., Tate v. Saratoga Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 265 Cal. Rptr. 440, 445 (Ct. App. 
1989). 
 253. See Martin Hunter, Ethics of the International Arbitrator, ARB., Nov. 1987, at 219, 
222 (neutral president often must “take a deep breath and select one of the party-nominated 
arbitrators to negotiate with” to arrive at a majority award); Rau, supra note 246, at 501–02; 
Murray L. Smith, Impartiality of the Party-Appointed Arbitrator, 6 ARB. INT’L 320, 333 
(1990) (requiring a majority “could lead to a negotiated majority award that is not based solely 
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well be effective in ordinary commercial arbitration, but it seems a 
problematic method for resolving difficult questions of international 
law affecting national sovereignty. The persuasive skills of the party-
appointed arbitrators and the bargaining skills of the president could 
predominate over the merits of the case. 
2. Confidentiality 
Another feature of the arbitration regimes specified by NAFTA is 
confidentiality. Again, while perhaps desirable in the resolution of a 
commercial dispute between private parties, confidentiality is trou-
bling in the context of weighty issues of sovereignty254 and the func-
tioning of court systems. Arbitrations in the ICSID Additional Facil-
ity occur in two phases: a written phase and an oral hearing. Both 
the filings submitted in the written phase and the oral hearings are 
confidential if a party desires it. Minutes are made of the oral hear-
ings, but these minutes may not be published without the consent of 
the parties.255 Under UNCITRAL rules, hearings are held in camera 
unless the parties agree otherwise.256 (In the ICSID proper, even the 
award may not be published without the consent of the parties.)257 
ICSID’s Additional Facility at least publishes basic docket informa-
tion on its new website regarding cases pending before that tribu-
nal.258 ICSID and UNCITRAL do not even do that, so the public 
might never find out about an arbitration in those fora. Govern-
ments have no obligations under these arbitration rules to disclose 
cases pending against them. The press learned of Loewen’s notice of 
claim against the U.S. government from a brief mention in its SEC 
10-Q report. 
 
 
on the merits of the case”). 
 254. See Gantz, supra note 78. 
 255. See ICSID AF Rules, supra note 245, art. 44(2). The Additional Facility rules also 
specify that, as early as possible after the tribunal is constituted, the president must try “to as-
certain the views of the parties regarding on questions of procedure.” Id. art. 29(1). These 
would include questions of confidentiality. 
 256. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Arbitration Rules (1976), 
art. 25 (visited Nov. 30, 2000) <http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.arbitration.rules.1976/ 
toc.html> [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules]. 
 257. See The World Bank Group International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, Part D, Rule 48 (visited Nov. 30, 2000) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/63.htm> [hereinafter ICSID Rules]. 
 258. See List of Pending Cases, supra note 43. 
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This lack of disclosure is common in arbitrations. It may well aid 
in the speedy and effective resolution of most commercial disputes 
by minimizing the collateral consequences of litigation, such as un-
pleasant publicity. However, the arguments in favor of disclosure are 
much stronger when the issue in question is the fairness of a judicial 
decision and the government is a party. If courts in America are 
reaching decisions that are denials of justice, courts’ reasoning 
should be aired publicly. Furthermore, the subject matter of the dis-
pute is not simply a matter of public concern; it is itself public. Trials, 
judicial decisions, and jury verdicts are public in the United States, 
and so little additional harm could be done by opening the hearings 
that deal with these questions. 
The confidentiality of proceedings is linked with a lack of input 
from others outside the process. There is no provision for amicus 
briefs under the NAFTA investor-state arbitration system. NAFTA’s 
investor-dispute mechanism does allow NAFTA Parties to make 
submissions resembling amicus briefs to an arbitration panel on 
questions involving the interpretation of NAFTA.259 For example, in 
the Loewen case, Canada could make a submission to the panel. Also, 
the arbitration panel could appoint experts to report in writing on 
factual issues concerning environmental, health, safety, or other sci-
entific matters raised by a disputing party. But these issues are lim-
ited in scope. They do not include expert consideration of a coun-
try’s or state’s legal system.260 The NAFTA provisions about 
arbitration—as well as rules of ICSID, ICSID-AF, and 
UNCITRAL—do not allow nonparties to submit amicus briefs. The 
state of Mississippi, for instance, in theory, cannot be heard directly 
in the Loewen case. Thus, on important questions concerning a 
country’s legal system, a very limited number of voices will be heard. 
Recent developments indicate that occasionally Chapter 11 panels 
may accept amicus briefs from nongovernmental organizations, but 
it remains to be seen how wide spread this practice becomes.261 
 
 259. See NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1124. 
 260. See id. art. 1133. 
 261. In one Chapter 11 dispute, the arbitration panel allowed a nongovernmental or-
ganization to file an amicus curiae brief. See Peter Menyasz, NAFTA Panel Says NGOs Can 
Intervene in Cases Brought for Arbitration Purposes, 18 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 211 (Feb. 1, 
2001). This occurred in the Methanex case, brought by the Canadian Methanex Corporation 
against the United States because of California’s 1999 decision to ban the gasoline additive 
MTBE. Methanex is claiming $970 million in damages. Peter Menyasz, Canadian, U.S. Gov-
ernments Support IISD on Access to Chapter 11 Tribunal Process, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 
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If a dispute settles, the results of that settlement are not made 
public. NAFTA is designed to strongly encourage settlement before 
arbitration.262 To submit a claim to arbitration, the claimant must 
wait six months after the events giving rise to that claim.263 At least 
ninety days before the claim is submitted, the claimant must give 
written notice to the other party of its “intention to submit a claim.” 
It must specify “the provisions of [NAFTA] alleged to have been 
breached,” “the issues and factual basis for the claim,” and “the relief 
sought and the approximate amount of damages claimed.”264 These 
six-month and ninety-day periods are intended to give the parties 
time for settlement negotiations. If a government and private party 
settle the claim before arbitration, such a settlement might not be 
made public. The public might not discover that the government 
was paying out substantial sums because of failures of justice in state 
or federal courts. 
3. Lack of appeal 
Appeals from arbitral decisions under NAFTA are strictly limited. 
The limited appeal makes the arbitration process efficient, which is 
highly desirable in private commercial arbitration. Under ICSID Ad-
ditional Facility rules, within forty-five days after the award a party 
may request an interpretation of the award265 or a correction for “any 
clerical, arithmetical or similar errors.”266 Also within that time pe-
riod, either party may request that the tribunal decide any question 
that it failed to decide in the award.267 That is the extent of review. 
There can be no reconsideration of issues already decided. 
UNCITRAL rules provide for almost identical procedures.268 
 
1901 (Dec. 14, 2000). Both the U.S. and Canadian governments supported the participation 
of the NGO, the International Institute for Sustainable Development. Id. Although this ruling 
is not binding on other NAFTA panels, it may prove influential. 
 262. See NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1118. 
 263. See id. art. 1120(1). 
 264. Id. art. 1119. 
 265. See ICSID AF Rules, supra note 245, art. 56. 
 266. Id. art. 57. 
 267. See id. art. 58. 
 268. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 256, arts. 35–37. Parties must re-
quest an interpretation, correction, or supplementary award within 30 after the award is made. 
There are somewhat different procedures in the ICSID itself, which provide for more thorough 
review. But these procedures do not apply to arbitrations under NAFTA, since neither Mexico 
nor Canada is a member of ICSID. Besides allowing supplementary decision, correction, and 
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These awards are binding on the parties. NAFTA declares that 
each NAFTA Party “shall provide for the enforcement of an award in 
its territory.”269 If a NAFTA Party fails to comply with a final award, 
the investor’s home country may begin proceedings against the los-
ing Party under Chapter 20. A panel established under that chapter 
may determine that the losing Party has violated its NAFTA obliga-
tions and recommend that the Party comply with the terms of the 
award. Failure to do so may trigger the right of the investor’s coun-
try to suspend benefits it provides under NAFTA.270 Other interna-
tional agreements can be brought into play to enforce an award. An 
investor can seek enforcement of an award under the ICSID Con-
vention, the New York Convention, or the Inter-American Conven-
tion.271 All of these provide tough enforcement mechanisms.272 
The requirement of reasoned decision making partially compen-
sates for the lack of an appeal. Each of the arbitration regimes speci-
fied under NAFTA requires that the award be in writing and the rea-
sons stated.273 A requirement of reasoned decision making is 
 
interpretation of the award, there are procedures for revision and annulment. See ICSID Rules, 
supra note 257, Rule 50. Revision is meant to deal with evidence that the tribunal was not able 
to consider previously, and may be done by the panel itself. Annulment is a more elaborate 
procedure. Grounds for annulment include the tribunal being improperly constituted, exceed-
ing its powers, being corrupt, seriously departing from a fundamental rule of procedure, or 
failing to state the reasons on which the award is based. See id. The Chairman of the Adminis-
trative Council of ICSID has appointed committees to review claims of annulment, see id. Rule 
52, and these committees have proved controversial. The procedure for annulment is so slow 
that it casts doubt on the ICSID’s efficiency. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL 
IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 46–106 
(1992). It should be noted that the grounds for annulment are still limited and do not include 
review of the substance of the tribunal’s decision. 
 269. NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1136(4). 
 270. See id. art. 1136. 
 271. See id. art. 1136(6). 
 272. The ICSID Convention, to which the United States is a signatory, provides that 
each contracting state is obligated to enforce an award “within its territories as if it were a final 
judgment of a court in that State.” The World Bank Group, International Centre for Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States, pt. A, ch. IV, art. 54(1) (visited Oct. 26, 2000) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/9.htm>. This is even more potent than the New 
York Convention. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards; Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion. 
 273. See ICSID Rules, supra note 257, Rule 47; ICSID AF Rules, supra note 245, art. 
53(1) (panel must also address every question submitted to it); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 
supra note 256, art. 32 (reasons must be given unless parties have agreed that no reasons are to 
be given). 
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conceptually linked with judicial appeal to enable review of the deci-
sion below. But it may constrain decision making even in the absence 
of review. It may force arbitrators to think systematically about 
claims and take into account various interests, legal authorities, and 
factual complexity.274 However, as legal realists have long pointed 
out, this requirement may instead simply spur the decision-maker’s 
ingenuity.275 Where the law is vague and unsettled—as it is in the 
area of state liability for denials of justice—little ingenuity is needed 
to justify any particular result. Customary international law allows a 
decision-maker to draw upon (or ignore) many sources in crafting 
reasons. In dealing with these claims, arbitrators are even less con-
strained than they normally are in the absence of effective review. 
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS 
There are several alternative ways to reduce problems posed 
by arbitrating denial-of-justice claims under the current NAFTA in-
vestor-state procedures. One is simply to amend the treaty to bar de-
nial-of-justice claims to say that the actions of a country’s judicial sys-
tem may never constitute violations of NAFTA.276 This approach 
seems extreme, however, in light of well-established principles of in-
ternational law and NAFTA’s goals to reduce discrimination against 
foreign goods and investors. U.S. investors may suffer. Eliminating 
denial-of-justice claims would create a loophole that national or local 
governments might exploit. 
 
 274. See ROBERT E. KEETON, JUDGING 137 (1990); Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 
47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 652 (1995); Lord Justice Bingham, Reasons and Reasons for Reasons: 
Differences Between a Court Judgment and an Arbitration Award, 4 ARB. INT’L 141, 143 
(1988); Kathleen Waits, Values, Intuitions, and Opinion Writing: The Judicial Process and State 
Court Jurisdiction, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 917, 931. 
 275. See Rau, supra note 246, at 531 & n.164. There are other benefits to giving reasons 
besides constraining arbitrators’ discretion. For example, reasons may reassure the parties that 
their arguments have been heard and considered. And they may serve as effective advertising 
for the arbitrators, who hope to be employed in future cases. See id. at 532, 535. 
 276. It may also be possible to interpret NAFTA as it currently exists to preclude denial-
of-justice claims, but this would be a stretch. Some might argue that NAFTA Article 1101 
supports such an interpretation. Article 1101, which is titled “Scope and Coverage,” states: 
“This Chapter applies to measures adopted or maintained by a Party relating to: (a) investors 
of another Party . . . .” It could be argued that the phrase “measures adopted or maintained” 
means only legislative or executive acts, not judicial ones. But in light of the well-established 
doctrine in international law that a state is responsible for the actions of its judiciary as well as 
its other branches, see supra Part V.A.1, this seems implausible. 
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A. An International Alternative: State-to-State Resolution of Denials 
of Justice 
A traditional alternative to eliminating denial-of-justice claims al-
together would be a return to requiring a state to bring a claim on 
behalf of its injured national. This traditional approach is used in the 
WTO.277 The procedures of NAFTA Chapter 20 (governing resolu-
tion of state-to-state disputes) could be used instead. Chapter 20 
governs all disputes between states except those involving subsidy 
and dumping issues, which are governed by chapter 19 and a few 
other narrow areas.278 A change to Chapter 20 procedures in denial-
of-justice cases would provide a better dispute mechanism and allow 
the state to filter the serious claims that touch on sovereignty. 
Chapter 20 creates a Free Trade Commission and a Secretariat to 
give administrative support for resolving state-to-state disputes.279 
The chapter provides a three-step process for resolving these dis-
putes: consultation, conciliation, and arbitration. The first two steps 
are required before reaching the arbitration phase.280 Consultation is 
simply an exchange of information between parties and an effort to 
resolve the dispute by negotiation between them.281 In the concilia-
 
 277. For example, the European Community brought a complaint on behalf of the 
Dutch company Akzo Chemie concerning U.S. export restrictions that were said to favor Du-
pont. This claim led to a panel decision. Chile has pursued the interests of its fruit export sec-
tor by bringing a number of disputes to GATT settlement. AMELIA PORGES, PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE 85TH MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13–14 (1993). 
Proposals to grant private parties access to the GATT dispute settlement system, in order to 
avoid them having to rely on their governments to take up the complaint, have not succeeded. 
Proposals to modify GATT in this way have come from several sources. See, e.g., JOHN H. 
JACKSON ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES 207–09 (1984); Miquel Montanà i Mora, A GATT with 
Teeth: Law Wins Over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 103, 161–62 (1993); Rudolf Ostrihansky, The Future of Dispute Settlement 
Within GATT: Conciliation v. Adjudication?, in THE UNITED NATIONS DECADE OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 125 (Marcel Brus 
et al., eds., 1991). An investor-state dispute mechanism was not included in the WTO ar-
rangements. See MARCEL M.T.A. BRUS, THIRD PARTY DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN AN 
INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 28–37, 207–08 (1995). Proposals for an investor-state provision 
would add an adversarial element to the procedures that is said to be not in harmony with the 
conciliatory approach to bringing governments into line with GATT rules. See PORGES, supra, 
at 14. 
 278. The other areas include emergency actions under Chapter 8 and financial services 
disputes under Chapter 14. 
 279. See NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 2001–02. 
 280. See id. art. 2008(1). 
 281. See id. art. 2006. 
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tion phase, the Commission assists the parties in reaching a resolu-
tion but does not itself act as a decision-maker.282 
Arbitration proceedings under Chapter 20 are notably different 
from those under Chapter 11. Arbitrators are chosen from a roster of 
up to 30 people who are put on the roster by agreement of the 
NAFTA Parties for terms of three years. They are to have expertise in 
law, international trade, or other matters covered by the agreement; 
be independent of the parties; and comply with a code of conduct 
established by the Commission.283 The panel consists of five arbitra-
tors. The chair is chosen by agreement of the parties; if there is no 
agreement, then the party chosen by lot picks a chair who is not a 
citizen of that party. Each of the parties then chooses two panelists 
who are citizens of the other party.284 The panel is to prepare a final 
report, with any separate opinions, which the parties then transmit to 
the Commission. Unless it decides otherwise, the Commission is to 
publish the report fifteen days after it receives it.285 
State-to-state dispute resolution would resolve some of the prob-
lems caused by the current investor-state procedures. The Chapter 
20 dispute mechanism is better designed to cope with difficult ques-
tions touching sovereignty than arbitrations under Chapter 11, since 
the Chapter 20 arbitrators are chosen from a roster of carefully-
selected experts, the arbitrators must abide by a strict ethics code, 
and their final report is made public. States filter out less serious 
claims. States can take into account comity interests in reciprocal re-
spect of legal decisions. Canada, like the United States, would not 
want to see its legal system lightly treated, as might occur if denial-
of-justice claims became common under Chapter 11. 
But Chapter 20 proceedings are far from perfect. First, panel de-
cisions are unappealable, and proceedings are confidential.286 Second, 
the implementation of the report is left rather vague. When the par-
ties receive the report, they are to “agree on the resolution of the 
 
 282. See id. art. 2007. 
 283. See id. art. 2009; see also Code of Conduct for Proceedings Under NAFTA Chapters 
Nineteen and Twenty, 59 Fed. Reg. 8720 (Feb. 23, 1994). 
 284. See NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 2011. 
 285. See id. art. 2017. 
 286. See Model Rules of Procedure for Chapter Twenty of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, Rule 35 (“The Parties shall maintain the confidentiality of the panel’s hear-
ings, deliberations and initial report, and all written submissions to and communications with 
the panel, in accordance with such procedures as may be agreed from time to time between 
representatives of the Parties.”). 
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dispute, which normally shall conform with the determinations and 
recommendations of the panel.”287 If the panel has determined that 
there has been a breach of NAFTA and the parties cannot agree on a 
resolution, the winning party is entitled to suspend the benefits it 
provides under NAFTA.288 This suspension should be, if possible, in 
the same sector as that in which the breach occurred. The Commis-
sion may establish a separate panel to determine whether the level of 
benefits suspended is “manifestly excessive.”289 
Decisions of the panel, therefore, are not binding. The winner of 
such an arbitration is given the right to retaliate by not having to 
abide by its normal obligations under the agreement. This has poten-
tial to lead to mini trade wars, such as those going on now concern-
ing the WTO’s decision on U.S.-produced hormone-fed beef and 
other matters.290 There has been some speculation that this form of 
retaliation could seriously weaken the WTO system, and the same 
might occur with NAFTA.291 However, bounded retaliation seems 
preferable to unbounded retaliation.292 Since states have proved ex-
tremely reluctant to accept binding dispute settlement, this sort of 
mechanism may be the most effective possible. The system of retalia-
tion interferes less with sovereignty and is less inflammatory than a 
monetary award. 
Perhaps the most serious disadvantage of barring investor-state 
claims is that states may be reluctant to bring claims on behalf of 
their nationals. States worry about straining relations with another 
country and complicating other areas of interaction. They also may 
decide that bringing such claims is not worth the time and effort. 
Countries may be inclined to bring claims on behalf of politically 
powerful constituents and ignore the claims of others. This latter 
 
 287. NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 2018(1). 
 288. See id. art. 2019(1). 
 289. Id. art. 2019(3). 
 290. See Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for 
World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 349 (1995); Kishore Gawande & Wendy L. Hansen, Re-
taliation, Bargaining, and the Pursuit of “Free and Fair” Trade, 53 INT’L ORG. 117 (1999); 
Kim Van der Borght, The Review of the WTO Understanding on Dispute Settlement: Some Re-
flections on the Current Debate, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1223 (1999). 
 291. See, e.g., Van der Borght, supra note 290, at 1232; Matthew Schaefer, National Re-
view of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: In the Name of Sovereignty or Enhanced WTO Rule 
Compliance?, 11 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 307, 335 (1996). 
 292. See, e.g., Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Getting Along: The Evolution of Dispute Resolu-
tion Regimes in International Trade Organizations, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 697, 712 (1999). 
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possibility is especially troubling because NAFTA was designed to 
encourage transnational interaction by smaller (and less influential) 
businesses in particular.293 
B. A National Alternative: Changes in Federal Diversity 
Requirements and Removal Statutes 
Scholars of international law are naturally apt to search for inter-
national solutions to international problems. But sometimes solu-
tions lie at the national level. One alternative for resolving the denial-
of-justice difficulty is an old idea: allow removal of cases involving 
aliens to federal court. The U.S. Constitution provides that the judi-
cial power of the federal courts “shall extend . . . to Controver-
sies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
Citizens or Subjects.”294 The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the federal 
circuit courts “original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the 
several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in eq-
uity, where . . . an alien is a party.”295 This was the Founders’ solu-
tion to the problems of bias in state courts, but the subsequent com-
plete diversity rule has undermined that solution. This section will 
explore the Founders’ view, examine the complete diversity rule, and 
suggest how the complete diversity rule might be modified to pro-
tect aliens from denials of justice in state courts. 
1. The Founders’ vision 
The Founders explicitly contemplated removal to federal court as 
a remedy for state-court bias against aliens. State-court bias against 
aliens caused the Founders great concern because, in the post-
revolutionary period, state courts were making it difficult or impossi-
ble for British creditors to collect debts owed by U.S. citizens.296 
 
 293. This concern with medium-sized and smaller businesses is evident in the inclusion of 
NAFTA Article 2022, which requires an Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Disputes 
to report to the NAFTA Commission on the availability, use, and effectiveness of arbitration 
and other dispute resolution procedures in the free trade area. See Terms of Reference for 
NAFTA Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Disputes, (visited Feb. 16, 2001) 
<http://www.ita.doc.gov/legal/adr_term.htm>. 
 294. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The Eleventh Amendment modified this provision to ex-
clude from federal judicial power suits brought by citizens or subjects of foreign countries 
against one of the states. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 295. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. 
 296. See Wythe Holt, The Origins of Alienage Jurisdiction, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 
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This obstruction was a violation of the United States’ obligations 
under the 1783 Treaty of Paris and threatened the flow of much-
needed capital into the new country.297 
Alexander Hamilton was the most outspoken supporter of 
alienage jurisdiction in the constitutional debates. Hamilton, writing 
in Federalist 80, made very clear that such diversity jurisdiction for 
aliens was necessary in order to fulfill the United States’ obligations 
under international law and to preserve good relations with other na-
tions.298 The federal judicial power, he said, should extend to all 
cases involving “the PEACE of the CONFEDERACY, whether they re-
late to the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations 
or to that between the States themselves.”299 Federal courts should 
handle such matters because “the peace of the WHOLE ought not to 
be left at the disposal of a PART.”300 He anticipated that the United 
States would be held responsible for state violations of international 
law: “The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers 
for the conduct of its members.”301 Therefore, the federal govern-
ment should have the means of preventing such violations: “the re-
sponsibility for an injury ought ever to be accompanied with the fac-
ulty of preventing it.”302 The consequences of injustice to foreigners 
in state courts could be grave, and the best means of avoiding it 
 
547, 553–62 (1989) (describing post-revolutionary debt crisis and anti-British creditor actions 
of state courts and legislatures); Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 
1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1430–53 (describing 
post-revolutionary debt crisis and anti-British creditor actions of state courts and legislatures); 
John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 
24 (1948). 
 297. Article IV of the Treaty of Paris provided that foreign creditors would “meet with 
no lawful Impediment to the Recovery of the full Value . . . of all bona fide Debts heretofore 
contracted.” Treaty of Paris, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 4, 8 Stat. 80, 82. Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs John Jay wrote a lengthy memorandum to the Continental Congress in 1786 
detailing massive American violations of Article IV and arguing that these violations might 
provoke war and damage the commercial prospects of the new nation. 31 JOURNALS OF THE 
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 781–884 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1934). James 
Wilson of Pennsylvania also expressed concern about the United States’ ability to attract capital 
if state courts could continue to discriminate against foreign creditors. 2 DEBATES ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 491–93 (Jonathan Elliot ed. 1987) [hereinafter 
Elliot]. 
 298. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 1, at 475. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at 476. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
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would be to hear such cases in federal court. “As the denial or per-
version of justice by the sentences of courts, as well as in any other 
manner, is with reason classed among the just causes of war, it will 
follow that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all 
causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned.”303 
Hamilton acknowledged that some might argue that the federal 
courts should hear only cases arising under treaties and the law of na-
tions and not those that concerned only local law. He argued that 
both types of cases should be heard in the federal courts. Denial of 
justice in cases concerning local law might itself violate international 
law. “[I]t is at least problematical whether an unjust sentence against 
a foreigner, where the subject of controversy was wholly relative to 
the lex loci, would not, if unredressed, be an aggression upon his 
sovereign, as well as one which violated the stipulations in a treaty or 
the general law of nations.”304 In addition, it could be very difficult 
to distinguish between cases involving local law and those involving 
national questions when a foreigner was a party.305 
Implicit in Hamilton’s discussion of federal court jurisdiction 
over aliens was the problem of bias in state courts. He warned 
against the “prevalency of a local spirit” in state courts and worried 
that the judges of certain states, “holding their offices during pleas-
ure [of the legislature or executive], or from year to year, will be too 
little independent to be relied upon” for impartial application of the 
laws.306 John Jay also expressed concern about state courts and “the 
different local laws and interests which may affect and influence 
them.”307 His concern was supported by his report on state courts’ 
failure to comply with the Treaty of Paris.308 At the Philadelphia 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 and elsewhere, James Madison 
several times referred to the need for protection against state court 
bias. At one point he bluntly said, “Confidence cannot be put in the 
State Tribunals as guardians of the National authority and inter-
 
 303. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(“It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations toward 
all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually 
done by one national government than it could be . . . by thirteen separate States . . . .”). 
 304. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 1, 476–77. 
 305. See id. 
 306. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 486 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
 307. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, supra note 303, at 43. 
 308. See supra note 297. 
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ests.”309 Referring to alienage jurisdiction, he asked, “Could there be 
a more favorable or eligible provision to avoid controversies with 
foreign powers? Ought it to be put in the power of a member of the 
Union to drag the whole community?”310 James Wilson of Pennsyl-
vania and William Davie of North Carolina made similar argu-
ments.311 And Chief Justice Marshall, in the 1809 case Bank of the 
United States v. Deveaux,312 also stated that fear of state court bias 
was the motivation behind diversity jurisdiction: 
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will 
administer justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of 
every description, it is not the less true that the constitution itself 
either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such 
indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it 
has established national tribunals for the decision of controversies 
between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different 
states.313 
It has been the fashion for some time to question whether local 
bias is still a problem in the state courts, if indeed it ever was a prob-
lem. Some academics and federal judges have argued that the sup-
posed advantages to removal are chimerical and that diversity juris-
diction only congests federal courts. In their view, diversity 
jurisdiction should be severely curtailed or even abolished alto-
gether.314 
 
 309. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 27 (Max Farrand ed., 
rev. ed., 1927). In the debate over whether to have lower federal courts, Madison referred to 
British debt cases and asked, “What was to be done after improper Verdicts in State tribunals 
obtained under the biased directions of a dependent Judge, or the local prejudices of an undi-
rected jury?” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 124 (Max Farrand 
ed., rev. ed., 1927). 
 310. 3 Elliot, supra note 297, at 533–34 (Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions). 
 311. 2 Elliot, supra note 297, at 491–93 (Wilson); 4 Elliot, supra note 297, at 158–59 
(Davie) (“[T]he denial of justice is one of the just causes of war. If these controversies were left 
to the decision of particular states, it would be in their power, at any time, to involve the con-
tinent in a war . . . . It is clear that where the peace of the Union is affected, the general judici-
ary ought to decide.”). 
 312. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809). 
 313. Id. at 87. 
 314. The literature on diversity jurisdiction is huge. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 210–221 (1996) (discussing literature); 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 23 (5th ed. 1994) (summarizing 
literature). One of the most formidable foes of diversity jurisdiction was Judge Henry Friendly. 
See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 139–52 (1973); see also 
Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 
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Today, because of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,315 federal di-
versity jurisdiction cannot solve problems of bias in state substantive 
law (or at least not to any great extent). Federal courts sitting in di-
versity jurisdiction must apply the state law, biased or not. Judge 
Henry Friendly suggested that, in part, federal diversity jurisdiction 
was meant to correct for biased state substantive law.316 Indeed, for-
mer West Virginia Chief Justice Richard Neely has argued that 
elected judges’ incentives have affected the substantive tort law of 
many states.317 Long before Erie, Justice Story said general common 
law should apply in alienage cases.318 In light of Erie, there seems lit-
tle prospect of returning to Swift v. Tyson-style319 general common 
law in cases involving aliens. 
Still, the Founders’ remarks suggest that diversity jurisdiction was 
designed to address bias in the application of the law. The denial-of-
justice claims focus on the same problem, and diversity jurisdiction 
could help.320 Out-of-state corporate defendants and aliens generally 
believe that federal courts provide them with a more impartial fo-
rum.321 Federal judges are not elected and receive no campaign con-
tributions. To ensure their independence and insulation from inter-
est group pressure, they hold tenure during good behavior and their 
salaries cannot be diminished.322 Federal judges may have political 
 
CORNELL L.Q. 499, 520–23 (1928); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: 
Positive Side Effects and Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1979); Larry 
Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REV. 97, 121–22. The arguments over parity be-
tween federal and state courts concerning diversity jurisdiction overlap with arguments about 
federal question jurisdiction. 
 315. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several 
States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1474–93 
(1997) (explaining the constitutional basis of the Court’s decision in Erie). 
 316. Henry J. Friendly, Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 
495 (1928). 
 317. NEELY, supra note 121, at 4, 53. 
 318. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES §§ 1691–94, at 568–71 (1833). Story stated that the “law to be administered in cases 
of foreigners is often very distinct from the mere municipal code of a state, and dependent 
upon the law merchant, or the more enlarged consideration of international rights and duties, 
in the case of conflict of the foreign and domestic laws.” Id at 570. 
 319. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 320. Erie itself suggested the goal of federal diversity jurisdiction was to provide a neutral 
forum. See 304 U.S. at 74. 
 321. See infra Part V.B.1. 
 322. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78, 79, at 464–75 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961). 
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and other biases, but at least they are not directly beholden to certain 
interests for their continuance on the bench. 
2. The complete diversity requirement 
A major stumbling block to removal to federal court has been 
the requirement of complete diversity. Where the interests are joint, 
each party on one side must be diverse from each party on the other 
side.323 This complete diversity is required to remove a case from 
state to federal court, and an action is removable only if none of the 
defendants with joint interests are citizens of the state in which the 
action is brought.324 These rules regarding complete diversity and 
removal allow plaintiffs to control removal to some extent. In order 
to defeat complete diversity, plaintiffs often join a local defendant, 
who often contributes little to a final resolution.325 For example, in a 
products liability case, plaintiffs might name a local dealer as well as 
an out-of-state manufacturer as defendants. The true target is obvi-
ously the out-of-state manufacturer’s deep pockets. The Loewen case 
provides a classic example of a similar maneuver: the Canadian and 
Delaware corporations were the actual targets, but O’Keefe also 
joined much smaller Mississippi corporations owned by Loewen, 
such as the Wright & Ferguson Funeral Home, to defeat diversity. 
Loewen mentions in its notice of claim that O’Keefe thereby “made 
it impossible for Loewen to remove the case to federal court, 
where all judges are appointed and have life tenure, and are 
thus not beholden to any particular local constituency.”326 
3. Abandoning the complete diversity requirement as to aliens 
Abandoning the complete diversity requirement—at least as to 
aliens—and allowing parties such as Loewen to remove cases to fed-
eral court would help considerably to prevent state court denials of 
justice for which the United States is liable under international 
law.327 The current complete diversity requirement allows parties to 
 
 323. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806). 
 324. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)-(b) (1994). 
 325. See Bill Aims to Get More Class Actions Under Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 67 
U.S.L.W. 2707 (June 1, 1999) [hereinafter Bill Aims]. 
 326. Loewen’s Notice of Claim, supra note 34, at 14–15. 
 327. Even those who have opposed diversity jurisdiction generally have advocated retain-
ing it in alienage cases and even applying a minimal diversity test to such cases. See, e.g., Rowe, 
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defeat removal to federal court on technicalities irrelevant to the ac-
tual dispute. Hamilton’s goal of preventing international strife is thus 
frustrated. Abandoning the complete diversity requirement as to 
aliens may be the solution that is least damaging to federalism con-
cerns. How might this be done? 
The complete diversity requirement is not to be found in the 
words of the Constitution nor on the face of the diversity statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1332. It is a long-standing judicial construction of the stat-
ute, which dates back to Chief Justice Marshall’s 1806 opinion in 
Strawbridge v. Curtiss,328 construing the Judiciary Act of 1789 
(which contained no specific language on the question). The opinion 
in Strawbridge is only a few sentences long and gives no reasoning 
for the decision, but federal courts have followed Strawbridge ever 
since. One could argue that, since Strawbridge, joinder rules have 
become much less restrictive, so a change in the complete diversity 
rule is now justified.329 
The Supreme Court, in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. 
Tashire,330 held that the complete diversity rule is a statutory con-
struction, not a constitutional requirement. Also in that case, the 
Court construed the federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335, 
to require only “minimal diversity”—diversity of citizenship simply 
between two or more claimants—rather than complete diversity. 
Like the other jurisdictional statutes, § 1335 did not specify exactly 
what type of diversity was required; in requiring only minimal diver-
sity, the Court said it considered “[t]he language of the statute, the 
legislative purpose . . ., and the consistent judicial interpretation tac-
itly accepted by Congress” not to require complete diversity in inter-
 
supra note 314, at 967 (briefly discussing alienage jurisdiction and favoring minimal diversity 
in such cases largely because of “possible effects on the foreign relations of the United States”); 
Kramer, supra note 314, at 122 (same). See also REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITTEE 39–40 (1990) (recommending abolition of diversity jurisdiction except for suits 
involving aliens and interpleader); H.R. 6691, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (bill that would 
have abolished diversity jurisdiction but retained alienage jurisdiction); Johnson, supra note 
143, at 58 (“The complete alienage requirement . . . fails to appreciate fully the foreign rela-
tions implications raised if an alien is a party to a lawsuit.”). 
 328. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). 
 329. In addressing diversity and removal, however, Congress and the courts have tried to 
compensate for more permissive modern joinder rules with doctrines concerning “separate and 
independent . . . cause[s] of action,” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1994), and “additional parties,” id. 
§ 1332(a)(3). 
 330. 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967). 
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pleader cases.331 The Supreme Court has proved willing to modify 
the complete diversity requirement in certain contexts. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not decided whether complete di-
versity is required in a case involving an alien. The lower courts have 
assumed that complete diversity is required, often citing the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision in Ed and Fred, Inc. v. Puritan Marine Insurance 
Underwriters Corp.332 
Judicial decision could possibly abolish the complete diversity re-
quirement for cases involving aliens. But this is unlikely for several 
reasons. The complete diversity requirement has acquired the au-
thoritative patina of time, and judges are loathe to disturb long-
standing statutory constructions.333 Judges tend to be opposed to 
expansion of federal jurisdiction, particularly diversity jurisdiction, 
arguing that it overloads federal courts.334 Finally, the removal stat-
ute, § 1441, requires that none of the defendants be a citizen of the 
state where the action was brought.335 
The better course for abolishing the complete diversity require-
ment as to aliens would be congressional action. Congress need only 
amend the removal statute to provide that an alien can always re-
move a case to federal court, regardless of other parties’ diversity, in 
the same manner that a foreign state can.336 Additionally, it would be 
possible to give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over alienage 
cases.337 But this seems unnecessary because, in practice, foreign de-
 
 331. Id. at 530. 
 332. 506 F.2d 757, 758 (1975). 
 333. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989). 
 334. For example, the Judicial Conference of the United States voted in March 1999 to 
oppose bills that would permit minimal diversity and eliminate the amount in controversy re-
quirement for suits concerning Year 2000 computer failures. The Conference’s statement said 
that the bills could potentially cause a massive overload of the federal court system, “resulting 
in substantial costs and delays.” Judicial Council Headed by Chief Justice Registers Opposition to 
Year 2000 Bills, 67 U.S.L.W. 2555 (Mar. 23, 1999). 
 335. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1994). 
 336. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) provides that “[a]ny civil action brought in a State court 
against a foreign state . . . may be removed by the foreign state to the district court of the 
United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 
The section further provides that the case shall be tried in federal court without a jury, which 
may well be important given the extra care necessary in dealing with sovereign states, but per-
haps would not be so significant in a case involving private parties. In addition, the section 
provides that the time limitations for removal in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) may be enlarged “at 
time for any cause shown,” which would make sense in the alienage context as well. 
 337. See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) (“Congressional power to ordain 
and establish inferior courts includes the power ‘of investing them with jurisdiction either lim-
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fendants would probably remove and might as well be given the 
choice. If they could remove, but chose not to, and a denial of jus-
tice resulted in state court, they arguably failed to take advantage of a 
remedy provided and so cannot claim damages against the United 
States under agreements such as NAFTA.338 
After the case is filed, changing circumstances may affect diversity 
jurisdiction. For example, a foreign defendant might be joined in a 
case after the initial filing. The longstanding rule is that a case cannot 
be removed on the basis of diversity unless the required diversity ex-
isted both at the commencement of the suit and at the time of filing 
the petition for removal.339 An exception exists if the plaintiffs’ vol-
untary action (including dismissal or settlement) causes a change in 
circumstances.340 To prevent discrimination against aliens, an alien 
ought to be able to remove whether joined by a plaintiff or defen-
dant.341 If this rule should prove too burdensome to the federal sys-
tem, then removal could be allowed at least where the alien was 
joined by a plaintiff. As is the case with cases involving foreign 
states, the strict time limits for removal in § 1446(b) ought not to 
apply in alienage cases.342 
Shifting these cases from state to federal court is of course not 
without cost to the federal judicial system. The Association of Trial 
Lawyers of America (“ATLA”), a pro-plaintiff’s lawyer group, claims 
that the proposed class action reform allowing greater removal to 
federal court “would cause an even greater backlog of the civil dock-
ets [in federal court], eventually discouraging consumers from ever 
bringing their cases.”343 However, backlogs in state courts are often 
greater than those in federal courts; measures transferring cases to 
federal court might actually improve the situation by relieving the 
harder-pressed state courts.344 
 
 
ited, concurrent, or exclusive . . . .’” (quoting Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (How.) 236, 245 
(1845)). 
 338. See infra discussion of exhaustion of local remedies rule. 
 339. See Gibson v. Bruce, 108 U.S. 561, 563 (1883). 
 340. See numerous cases cited at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446, ann. 484–90 (West 1999). 
 341. This is the case with the removal rules governing foreign states. See 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1441(d) (1994). 
 342. See id. 
 343. Congress, Judicial Conference Mull Changes to Class Action, Mass Tort Rules, supra 
note 129, at 2724 (quotation of Carlton Carl of ATLA). 
 344. See POSNER, supra note 314, at 219. 
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In any case, alienage cases form a relatively small proportion of 
the docket. According to the most recent data available from the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (for the year ending June 
30, 2000), the total number of diversity cases filed in federal court, 
including cases removed, was 49,603.345 Of these, foreigners were 
listed as defendants in 1,136 cases, or 2.3% of the total diversity 
cases. (Foreigners were listed as plaintiffs in 1,353 cases, or 2.7% of 
the total.) 
Allowing aliens more power to remove to federal court may be 
politically feasible. Congress recently has attempted to modify diver-
sity requirements in other contexts, notably class actions.346 During 
the last Congress, both the House and the Senate were working on 
legislation that would permit removal of many more class actions to 
federal court by abolishing the traditional requirement that every de-
fendant be diverse from every named plaintiff.347 The House ap-
proved its version, while the Senate Judiciary Committee reported its 
version to the floor last June.348 According to its supporters, the 
measure was necessary in part to prevent plaintiff’s attorneys from 
capitalizing on political goodwill with their local elected judges.349 
The bills had enthusiastic business support. It seems that business 
groups have shifted their tactics somewhat from focus on changes in 
substantive law, through tort and punitive damages reform, to focus 
on changes in procedure.350 
 
 
 345. This statistic and the ones that follow were provided by the Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts, Analysis and Reports Branch, Statistics Division. The information is 
derived from the civil cover sheets of cases filed. 
 346. Congress has also tinkered with diversity jurisdiction for aliens by amending the di-
versity statute in 1988 to provide that “an alien admitted to the United States for permanent 
residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which such alien is domiciled.” 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1332(a) (1994). 
 347. See S. 353, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1875, 106th Cong. (1999); see also House 
Judiciary Committee Approves Bill Vastly Expanding Federal Class Action Power, 68 U.S.L.W. 
2068 (Aug. 10, 1999); Bill Aims, supra note 325, at 2707. The requirement for diversity in 
class actions that every named plaintiff be diverse to every defendant was established in Su-
preme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921). 
 348. Senate Judiciary OKs Class Action Bill, Rejects Attempts to Carve Out Exemptions, 69 
U.S.L.W. 2006, 2006–07 (July 4, 2000). A filibuster was threatened. Id. 
 349. See Congress, Judicial Conference Mull Changes to Class Action, Mass Tort Rules, su-
pra note 129, at 2723. 
 350. See id. at 2724 (remarks attributed to Sherman Joyce, president of the American 
Tort Reform Association). 
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Procedural changes such as allowing removal in more cases may 
prove to be much more politically palatable than broad-based federal 
tort reform. And they may even work to solve the problem better, 
since more of the biggest verdicts are being awarded in contract dis-
putes, for example.351 If the federal government altered the law of 
torts, or even contracts, ingenious plaintiffs’ lawyers and judges 
could likely find new ways of transferring money from out-of-state 
defendants to in-state plaintiffs. It would be far better to remove 
these cases altogether from the state systems. 
Foreign interests often do not have the same domestic clout as 
U.S. commercial interests, but they do have NAFTA and a certain 
degree of international pressure on their side. If the Loewen arbitra-
tion produces an award against the United States, and, even if it does 
not but there is still danger of such awards, this could provide a spur 
against Congress’s normal inertia. The prospect of paying out hun-
dreds of millions of dollars to compensate foreigners for denials of 
justice in state courts—with the accompanying loss to U.S. prestige 
around the world—might galvanize Congress’ will to act. 
4. The difference a federal forum makes for aliens 
Litigating a case in federal rather than state court would make a 
difference to aliens in several ways. The most important difference, 
which the analysis in Part III.B has already suggested, is the nature 
of the judges. Federal judges are not elected and have life tenure. As 
other commentators have noted, they are therefore likely to be less 
sensitive to popular xenophobia352 and not apt to favor lawyers (es-
pecially those of in-state plaintiffs) who contribute to judicial cam-
paigns. This relative lack of bias and favoritism may be manifested in 
various ways. For one thing, federal judges would probably be more 
likely to restrain lawyers’ rhetorical excesses in playing to jurors’ 
prejudices and generally to keep a firmer control of their courtroom, 
not ceding it entirely to the plaintiff’s lawyers. 
In addition, federal judges would be more likely to apply the 
substantive law fairly. Of course, because of Erie R. Company v. 
 
 351. See Galanter, supra note 5, at 1133; Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Prac-
tice and Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1, 8; MARK PETERSON ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 23–24 (1987). 
 352. See Johnson, supra note 143. The empirical study of Clermont and Eisenberg sug-
gests that bias against foreigners is not common in federal court. See Clermont and Eisenberg, 
supra note 143. 
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Thompkins,353 federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction must ap-
ply state substantive law. But many state laws allow considerable dis-
cretion in the laws’ application. For example, although state stan-
dards for review of punitive damages must be followed,354 federal 
courts may be more likely to exercise powers of remittitur. Empirical 
studies have suggested that these differences between federal and 
state judges are significant in cases involving in-state plaintiffs and 
out-of-state defendants.355 
Besides differences in judges, there may be significant differences 
in law. Federal procedural law may be more favorable to aliens in 
Loewen’s position than state procedures. State appeal bond require-
ments, for instance, most likely do not apply to cases removed to 
federal court.356 Of lesser importance, but perhaps still significant, is 
the fact that federal juries tend to be drawn from a broader geo-
graphic area than state juries,357 reducing the chance that juries will 
be exclusively drawn from one very populist and xenophobic area. In 
short, abandoning the complete diversity rule in alienage cases is not 
a panacea that will solve all problems facing aliens in American 
courts, but it should improve the situation considerably. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The denial-of-justice doctrine poses a challenge to our legal sys-
tem. As global trade grows, this challenge cannot be ignored if the 
United States is to retain its credibility as it urges other countries to 
adopt the rule of law and accountable legal systems. Even a few ex-
treme verdicts against foreign corporations or individuals damages 
 
 353. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 354. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 355. See Helland & Tabarrok, Electoral Institutions, supra note 131. 
 356. See Burlington Northern R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987) (holding that Alabama 
rule requiring unsuccessful appellant to pay 10% of judgment as an affirmance penalty does not 
apply to federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction). But see Cohen v. Beneficial Ind. Loan 
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (upholding application of a state bond requirement for share-
holder derivative actions even though Rule 23.1 is silent about such a requirement; the case 
predates Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) but is still good law). 
 357. See Johnson, supra note 143, at 54–55. Johnson focuses on the fact that drawing 
jurors from a narrow pool may sometimes help aliens, since the pool in a certain small area 
such as San Francisco may be more cosmopolitan and less biased against aliens than the 
broader pool in the Northern District of California. However, the dangers of a local pool 
would seem to be greater than the possible benefits for aliens. Plaintiffs often take care to lay 
venue in more biased areas, which is easier to do in state court. 
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the foreign perception of the United States’ commitment to justice. 
International solutions to the problem could be adopted, but 
they are likely to generate great friction within the United States. 
Decisions of international tribunals provide a ready focus for discon-
tent. As far as possible, it makes sense to find national solutions to 
international problems, to adjust our national law to avoid interna-
tional conflict. This was precisely the type of solution the Founders 
had in mind when they advocated alienage jurisdiction in the federal 
courts. The United States was preoccupied with building good for-
eign relations then, as a new nation struggling to keep the peace and 
to develop economically. Now again we find ourselves in a world in 
which international trade is vitally important. By eliminating the 
complete diversity requirement for aliens, we may manage to kill two 
birds with one stone: alleviate some of the most serious problems 
with our civil justice system and fulfill our international obligations. 
